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ABSTRACT 
In this study, the performance of the Rennies Provident Fund's management 
strategy is reviewed. The study aims to determine whether the Fund's 
management strategy created or destroyed shareholder value over the past 17-
year period of its existence up to and including the 2004 financial year. 
First, the Rennies Provident Fund's performance is reviewed against its internally 
set performance objective of returning CPI (consumer price index) + 3% to its 
members. Secondly, the Fund's performance is compared to that of similar 
pension funds. Thirdly, the performance objective that the Fund has set itself is 
critiqued against the performance objectives of other pension funds. Finally, the 
value-based performance measurement approach is applied to the fund to 
determine whether shareholder value has been created or destroyed in absolute 
money terms during the 2003 financial year. 
This study finds that the Rennies Provident Fund has on average achieved the 
required internally set benchmark of returning CPI + 3% over the 17-year period 
of its existence. However, when the performance of the Fund is compared to 
available data for similar funds over a 12-year period, this study finds that the 
Rennies Provident Fund performed poorly. Further, this study also finds that in 
absolute monetary terms, the Rennies Provident Fund destroyed shareholder 
value over the 17-year review period. 
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Fund management strategy 
For the purposes of this study, these are the 
members of the Rennies Provident Fund who 
make monthly contributions to the fund. 
This occurs when the Fund's returns are above 
the CPI + 3% as set in the Fund's draft policy 
document and also exceed returns from a 
passive benchmark.2 
This occurs when the Fund's returns are below 
the set minimum performance standards of CPI 
+ 3%, or when they are above it but below the 
returns from a passive benchmark. 
The long-term distribution of investors' assets 
among various asset classes, taking into 
consideration, e.g., the goals of the trustees, 
attitude to risk, time frame, etc. 
1 In this study a comparison will be made with returns offered by other actively managed funds 
with similar characteristics to those of the Rennies Provident Fund. Such a comparison could 
reveal that although internally focused reviews might conclude that shareholder value has been 
created, value has in actual fact been destroyed to the extent to which the Rennies Provident 
Fund has underperformed among its industry peers. 
2 Bodie et al 2002, advance that even if an actively managed fund gives back to its members 
returns above the set performance standards, but such returns are below those offered by a 
passively managed fund/benchmark, then the actively managed fund has by definition destroyed 
shareholder value to the extent to which its returns fall below those of the market index. 
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CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study evaluates the performance of the Rennies Provident Fund with the 
aim of expressing an opinion on whether the investment fund management 
strategy employed by the Fund has created or destroyed shareholder value. 
The Rennies Provident Fund ("the Fund") is a defined-contribution provident fund 
that was established in terms of the Pension Funds Act of 1956. The Fund was 
established on 1 May 1986. 
The stated principal long-term goal of the Fund is to provide a generous lump 
sum to members on retirement which will be the sum total of the individual policy 
holders' build-up of contributions and the real growth of the fund. More 
specifically, the Fund has set itself a long-term performance target of returning no 
less than (CPI + 3%) per annum. The Fund strives to find and maintain a balance 
between minimising the members' risk and maximising their benefits. To achieve 
this, the Fund requires superior investment returns, having due regard to the term 
and nature of the Fund's obligations and the associated investment risk. 
As it is a defined-contribution fund, the members bear all the investment risks 
and consequently take a keen interest in the performance of the Fund, as the 
Fund's cumulative performance will ultimately determine the final benefit due to 
them as members. In order to determine whether the Rennies Provident Fund's 
investment management strategy has destroyed or created shareholder value, 
three approaches can be employed: 
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=> The performance of the Fund can be reviewed against the performance 
objectives it has set for itself. To ascertain the true level of under-
performance or over-performance of the Fund it is imperative that the 
results obtained be compared to a suitable passive benchmark as well. 
This will enable the trustees of the Fund to make a sound decision either 
by electing to follow a passive investment strategy or by continuing to 
make use of the services of active fund managers. 
=> The performance of the fund can be compared to what other funds - which 
follow active management and are of similar characteristics as the 
Rennies Provident Fund - have returned to their members over the period 
under review, and 
=> One can use the value-based method as advanced by Bagot and 
Armitage (2003), which measures the managers' contribution by the 
difference between the final market value of the investors' holding in the 
fund, with its associated cash flows over time, and the final value of the 
equivalent holding in the fund's benchmark.3 
For this study, the answer to whether the fund is creating or destroying 
shareholder value will be ascertained using all three approaches. 
First, the Fund's returns will be compared to its set investment target of returning 
+3 percentage points above the applicable inflation rate. 
3 The value-based method is a form of money weighting, in that the impact of the manager's 
interval-specific decisions on the final value of the holding is positively related to the preceding 
cash flows made by the investor. Performance evaluation in terms of value is advantageous if 
there is more than one interval. It enables attribution analysis to be conducted precisely and 
transparently, and it enables the investor to be presented with a customised report of the 
manager's contributions to his or her holding. This information can not be provided satisfactorily 
using other performance evaluation approaches. 
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Secondly, the target that the Rennies Provident Fund has set itself will be 
reviewed in the light of what the Fund's industry peers have offered to their 
members as returns. To this end, comparison will be made to returns from 
retirement fund's exhibiting similar characteristics to the Rennies Provident Fund 
in respect of their members' risk profile, size and investment objectives. By 
comparing the actual performance of the Fund against the performance 
objectives it has set for itself and also against the returns from other similarly 
managed funds (or an applicable benchmark) with similar characteristics, this 
study will be able to determine whether there is additional shareholder value that 
the Fund might have destroyed. 
To illustrate this point, suppose that the Fund has returned on average 15% per 
annum over a 17-year period and that inflation has averaged 9% per annum over 
the same period while the market has returned 12% per annum for the same 
period4. If the Fund has set itself a return of +3% then one would conclude that 
shareholder value has been created, namely, to the degree to which the real 
returns of the Fund exceed those returned by the market. In this case that would 
be: 
Value created = (Realised real returns - Management costs) - Market portfolio 
real returns 
Where: 
=> Realised real returns are the Fund's returns, net after inflation as 
measured by the CPI; 
=> Market portfolio returns are the returns from a corresponding passively 
4 The 15% is net, after deduction of management fees and all other applicable costs. 
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managed zero-load fund; and 
=> Management costs equal the fees that are levied on members of the Fund 
by the investment fund managers managing the fund. 
Thus, 
Value created = (15% - 9%) - (12% - 9%) 
= 3% 
However, if similarly managed funds exhibiting the same characteristics as the 
Rennies Provident Fund have on average returned 17% over the same period, 
then the conclusion will be different5: 
Average Peer group real returns = (17% - 9%) 
= 8% 
Thus, comparatively the fund has underperformed among its peers by 
= 8% - 6% 
= 2% 
Added value amounting to 2% would in fact have been destroyed by the Fund. 
The added benefit of this approach would be that it gives an indication of whether 
the set performance target is aggressive enough in view of what members of the 
Fund can get elsewhere. 
Thirdly, the value-based method will be used to identify the impact of the Fund's 
investment management strategy on the member's investments in monetary 
5 The 17% is net after deduction of management fees and all other applicable costs. 
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terms as at the end of the 2003 financial year. In order to determine this impact, 
one-on-one interviews with a sample of the Fund's members will be carried out to 
gather the necessary data. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
This study was conducted against a backdrop of an increasing level of 
dissatisfaction from members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed at South 
African Container Depots (SACD) with the negative returns declared by the fund 
for the financial year ending 30 April 2003. The Fund declared returns of -5,7% 
for the year ending 30 April 2003 as a result of poor performance, which the 
administrators of the Fund ascribed to unfavourable equity market conditions. 
The majority of policyholders employed by SACD were strongly of the view that 
the investment management houses that were contracted to manage the assets 
of the Fund did not add value to the fund, because of their failure to make the 
necessary asset switches and minimise losses during the year 2003. 
In this study added value is defined by means of an adapted formula from Blake 
and Board (2000) as follows: 
Added value = (Realised real returns - Management costs) - Base fund value 
Where: 
• Realised real returns are the Fund's returns, after inflation as measured by 
the CPI; 
• Base fund value is the returns from a corresponding passively managed 
zero-load fund; and 
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• Management costs equal the fees that are levied on the members of the 
Fund by the investment fund managers appointed to manage the fund. 
Some policyholders held that the asset managers employed by the fund 
destroyed shareholder value as a result of incompetence which was more 
evident during the 2003 financial year. 
The negative returns posted for the 2003 financial year and the average bonus 
declaration of 13,0% per annum are advanced as the basis for the expressed 
lack of confidence on the performance of the Rennies Provident Fund in general. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In any business undertaking, those who pay for a service typically want to 
evaluate those who perform the service; in this regard the society of professional 
money managers is not immune.6 
As pointed out in the introductory section of this study, members of the Rennies 
Provident Fund were very dissatisfied with the negative 5,7% returns declared by 
the Fund for the 2003 financial year. This poor performance for the 2003 financial 
year was heavily felt by the policyholders who had been with the Fund for a long 
time; for some, the -5,7% returns translated to fund value reductions in excess of 
R17 000 to R20 000 for the 2003 financial year. Because of this poor 
performance, these members became extremely sceptical of the abilities of the 
fund managers in charge of the assets of the Fund and in fact suggested that 
there should be a management change. 
6 Investment Analysis and Portfolio Selection, (1983:772), 2nd Edition, South Western Publishing 
Company. 
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When confronted with market dynamics, funds that are actively managed should 
in principle deliver above-average returns and outperform indexed funds, 
precisely because of the market timing ability and stock selection prowess of the 
investment professionals managing these funds. 
This study seeks to determine whether the fund management strategy of the 
Rennies Provident Fund created or destroyed shareholder value since its 
inception. In view of the Fund's performance thus far, the trustees were also 
faced with the challenge of deciding whether the fund will not be better served 
following a passive investment strategy as opposed to making use of the different 
asset management houses that the fund has contracted. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The findings of this study can be used to elicit discussion amongst the trustees of 
the Rennies Provident Fund whether the Fund would not be better served by 
following a passive investment management approach, as opposed to the current 
active investment management approach. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The current study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
=> What were the posted returns of the Rennies Provident Fund to date, 
since its inception? 
=> Did these posted returns meet the Fund's set investment objectives? 
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Did the Fund have reasonable and competitive investment objectives over 
the observation period? 
What was the adopted fund management strategy of the Rennies 
Provident Fund over the observation period? 
What was the impact of this adopted fund management strategy on the 
investment holdings of the fund's individual members as at the end of the 
financial year 2003? 
With hindsight, was the asset allocation of the Rennies Provident Fund in 
2003 an optimal allocation, given the market outlook at the time? 
What alternative fund management strategies were available to the 
Rennies Provident Fund over the same observation period? 
How did these alternative fund management strategies perform, compared 
to the Rennies Provident Fund? 
Did the fund managers of the Rennies Provident Fund change their 
strategies in times of poor performance, and did these changes result in 
improved performance? 
Did the multi-manager approach used by the Rennies Provident Fund 
create the required cushion during the observation period? 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section will look at the research methodology to be followed and the 
reasoning behind it. The chosen research design will be discussed, and the 
discussion will include defining the appropriate population for the study, the 
sampling method to be used and the various types of data collection tools or 
measurement instruments. 
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1.6.1 Methodology Paradigm 
According to Neuman (1997), a research paradigm is a basic orientation to 
theory and research. Dietrich and Shafer (1984) argue that a methodology is an 
observation or measurement of a phenomenon of interest and can generally be 
classified as one of the following three types: 
=> Qualitative paradigm; 
=> Quantitative paradigm; and 
=> Triangulation. 
Since the aim of this study is to determine whether the Rennies Provident Fund 
created or destroyed shareholder value, i.e. to find a yes or no type of answer, a 
qualitative approach is more appropriate. The research methodology to be 
followed in this study is the qualitative single case study method. According to 
Tellis (1997), the case-study methodology is best suited to instances where the 
researcher wishes to investigate a specific case and does not intend to 
generalise the findings of the study. Further, in view of the fact that this study was 
initiated as an internal study by a member of the Rennies Provident Fund, the 
single case-study approach was found to be the most appropriate (Yin 1994 cited 
by Tellis, 1997) and (Stake 1995 cited by Tellis, 1997). 
1.6.2 Research Design 
A research design is a plan of how the research will be conducted. Thus, it 
covers the identification of research participants, the collection of information and 
its analysis. According to Stake (1995), with experimental studies and quasi-
experimental studies, the data collection and analysis methods are known to hide 
some detail. The case-study design, on the other hand, is holistic and allows for 
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in-depth investigation of phenomena. 
Case studies permit a multi-perspective analysis of phenomena which enables 
the researcher to consider the input of various actors and their interaction 
(Feagin et al 1991 cited by Tellis, 1997). Snow and Anderson (cited by Tellis, 
1997) asserted that a case study is known as a triangulated research strategy 
and that triangulation can occur with data, investigators, theories and even 
methodologies. According to Stake (1995), the protocols that are used to ensure 
accuracy and alternative explanations are called triangulation, and the need for 
triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes. 
It is for the above-mentioned reasons that the researcher will apply a case study 
designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the various stakeholders 
by using multiple sources of data (both primary and secondary sources). 
The identified data sources for this study are: 
=> Documentation from the Rennies Provident Fund, annualised returns from 
other funds, performance reports from various asset management firms, 
study reports or any other relevant documentation that could add to the 
database. 
=> Archival records, which include survey data (completed questionnaires). 
Confidentiality of the survey respondents is ensured by assigning 
codenames to the respondents. 
=> Interviews of trustees to fill in gaps in the policy documents. 
The population and sampling method will be discussed in the next section. 
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1.6.3 Population 
According to Donald and Schlinder (2003 cited Tellis, 1997), research projects 
have a unit of study which is generally referred to as the population element. 
While this population element can be a person, it can easily be something else. 
For the purposes of this study, the population element is specified as all the 
members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed by South African Container 
Depots in Cape Town during the fourth quarter of 2003. 
1.6.4 Sampling 
With many research projects there are generally financial and time constraints 
that researchers must grapple with. In order to manage these constraints, 
researchers take a sample of the target population and use the findings from the 
sample to generalise their findings (Donald and Schlinder, 2003 cited Tellis 
1997). 
For the purposes of this study, all the members of the Rennies Provident Fund 
were to be surveyed who were employed by South African Container Depots in 
Cape Town during the fourth quarter of 2003. Thus, no sample was to be drawn 
but a census was to be taken. 
The reason for choosing a census was that the target population was not more 
than 100 members and they were located in one depot in Cape Town. Thus it 
would not be expensive to survey all the members, and a census in turn would 
limit the error margins that are inherent in most research studies using samples. 
1.6.5 Data Collection Methods 
A case study is known as a triangulated research strategy (see 1.6.2). Stake 
(1995 cited by Tellis, 1997) stated that the protocols used to ensure accuracy 
and alternative explanations are called triangulation. The need to triangulation 
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arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the process. In case studies 
this could be done using multiple sources of data (Yin 1984 cited by Tellis, 1997). 
Tellis (1997) argues that the problem in case studies is to establish meaning 
rather than location. 
Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997) and Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) identified 
six sources of evidence in case studies, and these were: 
=̂> Documents 
=> Archival records 
=> Interviews 
=> Direct observation 
=> Participant-observation 
=̂> Physical artefacts 
According to Tellis (1997), when the researcher wants to triangulate evidence, 
documents can be used to corroborate evidence from other sources. For this 
study, only the first three sources of data listed above will be used, as discussed 
in section 1.6.2 above. Denzin (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997) identified four types of 
triangulation: data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to 
remain the same in different contexts; investigator triangulation, when several 
investigators examine the same phenomenon; theory triangulation, when 
investigators with different viewpoints interpret the same results; and 
methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by another, to 
increase confidence in the interpretation. 
According to Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997), there are three tasks that must be 
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carried out as part of the actual case study. These three tasks are: preparation 
for data collection, distribution of the questionnaire and conducting interviews. 
Data collection should be treated as a design issue that will enhance the internal 
validity of the study, as well as the external validity and reliability. 
In order to increase the reliability of the study, the survey questionnaire was to be 
hand-delivered to the participants through shift supervisors. Reminders would be 
sent to participants one week after the original contact to encourage participation. 
1.6.6 Analysis 
According to Tellis (1997), analysing case study evidence is the least developed 
aspect of the case study methodology and hence the most difficult. Tellis (1997) 
further states that some researchers have suggested that if the study were made 
conducive to statistical analysis, the process would be easier and more 
acceptable. Miles and Huberman (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997) suggested analytic 
techniques such as rearranging the arrays, placing the evidence in a matrix of 
categories, creating flowcharts or data displays, tabulating the frequency of 
different events, using means, variances and cross-tabulations to examine the 
relationships between variables, and other such techniques to facilitate analysis. 
Tellis (1997) argues that there must first be an analytic strategy that will lead to 
conclusions. Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) presented two strategies for general 
use: one is to rely on theoretical propositions of the study, and then analyse the 
evidence based on those propositions. The other technique is to develop a case 
description, which would be a framework for organising the case study. 
According to Tellis (1997), Lynd conducted a widely cited Middletown study in 
1929, and used a formal chapter construct to guide the development of the 
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analysis. Tellis (1997) further argues that in other situations, the original objective 
of the case study may help to identify some causal links that could be analysed. 
1.6.7 Validity and reliability 
Validity is a term used in research methodology which indicates the extent to 
which a test complies with the aim it was designed for. Reliability, on the other 
hand, deals with how certain a researcher is that an inference he/she has made 
is correct. Since all inferences are based on partial information about a 
population, there is always a chance that the inference made could be incorrect. 
The science of statistics however recognises this fact and requires that every 
inference be accompanied by a measure of reliability. Dietrich and Schafer (1984 
cited by Tellis, 1997). 
According to Tellis (1997), reliability and validity are the most critical elements of 
all research projects. 
1.7 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
This case study is important to the Trustees of the Rennies Provident Fund as it 
will provide them with empirical evidence of how the members of the Fund 
perceive the performance of the Fund, while also providing important information 
on their risk profile and preference. 
This case study can also assist in eliciting discussion amongst the trustees on 
the desirability of continuing with the current investment fund strategy in view of 
the Fund's historical performance compared to similar pension funds, as well as 
the demographic profile of the Fund's membership. 
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1.8 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
According to Tellis (1997), early criticism of the case study as a research 
methodology was that it was unscientific in nature because replication was not 
possible. Notwithstanding this limitation, Tellis (1997) pointed out that early 
literature contained major refutations by Yin, Stake, Feagin and others whose 
work resulted in a suggested outline for what a case study protocol could include. 
Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) stated that the case study protocol should include 
the sections that are outlined in table 1.1: 
Table 1.1 - Case Study Protocol 
Section 
Overview of the 






This will include project objectives, case study issues, and 
presentations about the topic under study. 
Reminders about procedures, credentials for access to 
data sources and location of those sources. 
The questions that the investigator must keep in mind 
during data collection. 
The outline and format of the report. 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) argues that the inclusion of the sections outlined 
above results in a rigorous research exercise that can be replicated. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments for and against the case study 
methodology, all methodologies have their inherent limitations. 
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The rationale for using multiple sources of data in case studies is the 
triangulation of evidence, as advanced by Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997). 
However, the cost of using multiple sources of data and the researcher's ability to 
access the required data and carry out the analysis should be taken into account. 
The limitations or weaknesses of the relevant data sources for this study are as 
follows: 
=> Documentation maybe difficult to retrieve and at times might be biased; 
=> Interviews may be biased or difficult to secure; 
=> Direct observation will be time-consuming and costly; 
=> Archival data may be selective and/ or unavailable. 
Quality of data: in studies such as this one, it is not generally possible to state 
with 100 % confidence that fund performance is solely a function of the fund 
management's investment strategy or approach. 
The researcher will attempt to minimise the effects of the above-mentioned risks 
by using the triangulation methodology. Triangulation will give rise to data with a 
high level of validity to determine whether the fund's investment management 
strategy has created or destroyed shareholder value for the period under 
investigation. 
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1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
The remaining chapters of this study are structured as follows: chapter 2 
introduces and discusses the theoretical framework of the qualitative single case 
study research methodology; chapter 3 discusses the relevant literature; in 
chapter 4 an in-depth analysis of the Rennies Provident Fund is undertaken; in 
chapter 5 tentative observations and findings are presented and discussed; and 
finally in chapter 6 conclusions are drawn. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter relevant literature is discussed and reviewed in relation to the 
current study. 
2.2 VALUE CREATION AND VALUE DESTRUCTION 
According to Arnold (2002), management is often judged to have destroyed 
shareholder value when they have put resources into activities that do not 
produce a high enough return that covers the cost of using the money. Stern and 
Chew (2001) agree with Arnold (2002) when they state that in order for a 
company to increase shareholder value, it must stop investing in, and find ways 
to release capital from activities that earn substandard returns. Arnold (2002) 
points out that value is created when an investment produces a rate of return 
greater than that required for the risk class of the investment. Arnold (2002) 
states that shareholder value is driven by the four factors shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 - The four key elements of value creation 
Actual rate of return 
on capital invested 








Required rate of 
return 
Source: Arnold (2002). 
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The difference between the actual rate of return on capital invested and the 
required rate of return creates the performance spread. Value is destroyed if the 
required rate of return is greater than the actual rate of return. The performance 
spread is measured as a percentage spread above or below the required rate of 
return, given the finance provider's opportunity cost. The "amount of capital 
invested" element determines the absolute amount of value generated by the 
performance spread. If, for example, pension fund XYZ has a required rate of 
return of 13% per annum and the actual rate of return equals 18%, on an 
investment base of R1 000 000,00, the fund will create R50 000,00 of value for 
that given year: 
Annual value created = Investment x (actual returns - required returns) 
= / x (r - k) 
= R1000 000,00 x (0,18-0,13) 
= R50 000,00 
Given the widely accepted notion of market efficiency and the random walk 
theory, it is considered unreasonable to assume that negative or positive 
performance spreads can/will be maintained in perpetuity. If a given fund had 
taken advantage of a temporary stock mispricing and profited from the 
mispricing, the market will, in response, self-adjust and erode the positive spread 
over time. Also if a manager has achieved negative performance spreads, that 
manager will reasonably take corrective actions to reverse the poor performance. 
Thus in shareholder value analysis is it assumed that returns will over time be 
driven towards the required rate of return hence the need to look into the 
performance spread persistence. See Table 2.1 below for an illustrative example 
of this point: 
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Source: Adapted (2005). 
As stated above, in order to translate the value that has been created or 
destroyed, into absolute monetary terms, this study will first determine the 
performance spread for the respective observation periods. This performance 
spread is defined as the excess actual returns above the required returns. Then 
this performance spread is multiplied by the actual amount invested for the period 
under review. In the case of the 1998 period for instance, the performance 
spread is -4% and the actual investment for the period is R450 000, hence the 
value destroyed is R18 000. Figure 2.2 gives a graphical representation of the 
data in Table 2.1. 
Figure 2.2 - Value Created/Destroyed for Pension Fund XYZ 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
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Note that for the years 1998, 2001 and 2003 shareholder value was destroyed to 
the extent that the required percentage returns exceeded the actual returns for 
that year multiplied by the amount then committed to the investment portfolio. 
Arnold (2002) identifies five actions that are available for increasing shareholder 
value, these are listed below: 
• Increase the returns on existing capital investments; 
• Raise investment in positive spread units; 
• Divest assets from negative spread units to release capital for more 
productive use; 
• Extend the planning horizon; and 
• Lower the required rate of return.7 
According to Stern and Chew (2001), shareholder value can also be created by 
adopting strategies that minimise the tax liability of a fund. The following adapted 
matrix (Figure 2.3) can be used to analyse the value creation profile of a pension 
fund scheme by its portfolio holding weights vs. performance spread. 
7 It should be noted that the last action does not increase shareholder value but rather creates a 
false impression that value has been created by lowering the performance benchmark. 
- 2 9 -
Figure 2.3- Value creation profile - Capital investment proportion vs. value 
created 
S 
P r o p o r t i o n s o f c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
By not using high-level overviews such as the one above, firms tend to fail to 
identify and root out value-destructive activities. According to Hagstrom (2001), 
many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and 
incremental capital have employed a large portion of their retained earnings on 
an economically unattractive, even disastrous basis. But these value-destructive 
capital allocations are camouflaged by some high performing units.8 
2.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN PENSION FUNDS LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
According to Downie (2003), the recognition by the South African government of 
the importance of the retirement fund industry can be traced back to as early as 
the 1920s. As advanced by Downie (2003), the major reason behind the 
attempts by government to formalise the pension fund industry in South Africa 
Berkshire Hathaway 1984 Annual Report. 
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was to secure a certain level of protection of the fund members who had paid 
contributions to their employers in the expectation of receiving benefit pay-outs 
upon retirement. Equally important also, argues Downie (2003), was the desire 
by the South African government to ensure that retirement fund's adhered to 
certain standards, which prevented the funds from easily going insolvent. These 
early attempts by the South African government to enact appropriate legislation 
to govern the retirement fund industry positioned the country as a pioneer in this 
respect. Other countries regulated the industry through a number of laws and 
legal principles at the time. 
The South African Pension Funds Act No. 24 of 1956 formally defines a 
retirement fund as: 
"(a) any association of pensions established with the object of providing 
annuities or lump sum payments for members or former members of 
such association upon reaching the retirement dates or for the 
dependants of such members or former members upon the death of such 
members or former members; or 
(b) any business carried on under a scheme or arrangement established with 
the object of providing annuities or lump sum payments for persons who 
belong or belonged to the class of persons for whose benefit that 
scheme or arrangement has been established, when they reach their 
retirement dates or for dependants of such persons upon the death of 
those persons." 
As can be discerned from the formal definition of the Act, the primary purpose of 
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a retirement fund is to provide a form of benefit to its members upon retirement or 
to their dependants in cases where the principal members have passed away. 
The importance of maintaining a balance between the fund's assets and its 
liabilities going forward into the future can never be overemphasised, given that 
the fund's main investment objective is to enable the fund to meet its current and 
future liabilities by securing for its members the best overall returns on 
investment at acceptable risk levels. 
2.4 LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS - PRUDENT INVESTMENT 
REQUIREMENTS 
In South Africa the Registrar of Pension Funds has laid down prudent investment 
requirements in an attempt to deter funds from having an inappropriate balance 
between risk and returns or assets and liabilities. The most prominent of these 
requirements are contained in Regulation 28, in the circulars from the Financial 
Services Board, and in section 19 of the Pension Funds Act. Section 19 regulates 
issues such as the conditions under which a fund may invest in the employer's 
business, as well as the conditions under which a fund may grant loans to its 
members such as deposits for a house. 
Regulation 28, on the other hand, primarily forces retirement funds to adopt a 
prudent approach when choosing which asset classes to invest the fund's assets 
in. Through these directives, the Registrar attempts to keep down the 
comparative risk exposure faced by the retirement fund industry vis-a-vis other 
industries like the mutual fund industry. These directives have a direct impact on 
the comparative overall performance of retirement funds when looked at against 
the performance of, for example, mutual funds over the same period. The 
directives laid down by the Registrar represent a management constraint in 
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relation to the investment choices that fund managers can make in pursuit of 
superior returns. Thus when analysing the performance of fund managers 
managing retirement funds vis-a-vis those managing mutual funds, allowance 
should be made for these constraints, as the posted results will not be a true 
reflection of the manager's potential. 
Through Regulation 28, the Registrar determines the level of exposure that 
retirement funds can enjoy by stating clearly the maximum positions that certain 
asset classes can take as a percentage of the fund's total assets. 
Regulation 28 prescribes the following limitations on various asset holdings: 
• For shares and property combined, the maximum is 90 %, with the 
following provisos: that no more than 5 % of the fund's assets can be 
invested in any unlisted or Development Capital Market stock; no more 
than 10 % in any unlisted company with a capitalisation of less than R2bn; 
no more than 15% in any listed company with a market capitalisation of 
more than R2bn, and, for the percentage invested in property, no more 
than 5 % of the property portfolio in any one property; 
• For claims secured by mortgage bonds on immovable property the 
maximum is 25% of the fund's assets, of which no more that 0,25 % 
should be for any one individual; 
• For Kruger rands, the maximum is 10 %; and 
• As for cash, fixed deposits, gilts and semi-gilts, no limitation exists except 
for the requirement that no more than 20 % of the fund's assets should be 
invested with any one institution. 
The requirements of Regulation 28 apply to all registered pension and provident 
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funds, even those that invest part of their assets in insurance policies. The 
responsibility of ensuring that the regulated distribution is kept rests with the 
funds themselves. However, there are certain cases where the Registrar can 
grant conditional as well as unconditional exemption from the requirements of 
Regulation 28.9 
It is important to note that there are other legislative constraints that impact on 
asset-type holdings and that override Regulation 28. A typical case concerns 
offshore investing: Regulation 28 permits much more that 15 % to be invested in 
assets outside South Africa, but because of the overall limit of 15% set by the 
Exchange Control, the maximum then effectively becomes 15%. 
2.5 OTHER CONSTRAINTS 
Accompanying the constraints placed on fund managers by legislation is the 
investment mandate that they get from the trustees of the pension fund. These 
constraints can either be direct or indirect. Directly, trustees can influence asset 
selection by setting limits over and above those specified by law, depending on 
their risk appetite. 
Indirectly they can influence selection even within the same asset classes. For 
example, if the investment mandate advocates a socially responsible investment 
approach, managers might steer away from stock belonging to Company X which 
trades in alcoholic beverages even though the stock might be the best performing 
at the time in favour of stock from a company that trades within the same sector 
but in non-alcoholic beverages. 
A discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this study and will be omitted. 
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2.6 TYPES OF RETIREMENT FUNDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
There are a variety of retirement funds in operation in South Africa. They all 
conform to the above legal definition and are all subject to the dictates of the 
above-mentioned Regulation 28. 
Retirement Funds can either be defined-contribution funds or defined-benefit 
funds. Further, funds can either be classified as provident funds or pension 
Funds; still within these classifications, a fund can either elect to be a passive 
fund or an actively managed fund. These different classifications are discussed 
below and their implications for members are also highlighted. 
2.6.1 Defined benefit-plans and defined-contribution plans 
According to Downie (2003), a defined-contribution plan specifies the amount to 
be contributed to the fund by both the members and their employers, but it does 
not specify the amount to be paid to the members as their final benefit on 
retirement. Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) state that with this type of plan the 
investment risk is borne by the members of the fund. With defined-contribution 
plans the future payout amount is the member's accumulated contribution as well 
as the employer's portion, plus a proportional sum total of the real investment 
returns that have over time accrued to the fund. Bodie et al (2002) advance that 
with defined-contribution plans the retirement account is by definition fully funded 
by the contributions, and the employer has no legal obligation beyond making its 
periodic contributions, which is not the case with defined-benefit plans. With a 
defined-contribution plan, therefore, the task of setting and achieving the income 
replacement goals falls squarely on the employee who normally delegates this 
responsibility to the trustees. Downie (2003) argues that with defined-contribution 
schemes the final payout to members is a function of a variety of variables such 
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as: 
• the value of the contributions paid into the fund by both employer and 
member until the member's retirement; 
• the annuity rate at the time of retirement in the case of a pension fund; and 
• the investment performance of the fund. 
Bodie et al (2002) state that with the defined-benefit plan the fund specifies 
exactly how much the member will get on retirement. Thus with this type of plan 
the employer bears the investment risk and not the members, as their benefit 
payouts are guaranteed by the employer. According to Asthana and Lipka 
(2002), higher returns imply lower employer contributions to the defined-benefit 
pension fund in the future. With defined contribution plans, however, higher 
returns mean more value is created directly for the members of the pension fund, 
but not for the employer as is the case with defined-benefit plans. 
In explaining the difference between these two types of plan, Bodie et al (2002) 
advance that one of the defining factors for these two types of plan is that the 
defined-contribution plan is in effect a tax-deferred retirement savings account 
established by an organisation in trust for its employees. They further point out 
that the fundamental difference consists in the fact that members of defined-
contribution funds bear all the investment risks with regard to the performance of 
the fund and reciprocally receive all the returns from the plan's assets. In a 
defined-contribution scheme, monthly contributions are usually specified as a 
fraction of the member's salary. The same does not hold true for benefit 
payments as is normally the case with final benefit computation in defined-benefit 
plans. 
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Bodie et al (2002) argue that with a defined-benefit plan, a formula specifies the 
benefits, but not the manner, including contributions, in which these benefits are 
funded. The principal characteristic of this formula is that it takes into account the 
years of service for the employer and the level of wages or salary earned by the 
employee. With this type of plan the plan sponsor (employer) guarantees the 
benefits and thus absorbs the investment risk. To the employer the obligation to 
pay the promised benefits is more like a long-term debt. Bodie et al (2002) argue 
that if one were to go by both the number of plan participants and the value of the 
total pension liabilities, the defined-benefit plan dominates in most countries 
around the world. 
According to Bodie et al (2002), the fund is a separate pool of assets set aside to 
provide collateral for the promised benefits, while the plan is merely a contractual 
arrangement setting out the rights and obligations of all parties to the 
arrangement. This serves as a critical distinguishing factor between the pension 
plan and the pension fund. Bodie et al (2002) further advance that, with defined-
contributions plans, by definition, the value of the benefits equals that of the 
assets, so the plan is always fully funded. Defined-benefit plans, on the other 
hand, can be either under-funded or over-funded, depending on whether the 
present value of the fund's liabilities exceeds the market value of the plan's 
assets or v/ce-i/ersa.10 
Downie (2003) cautions about a major disadvantage to the employer with the 
latter type: the employer might be required to pay in more to the fund in order to 
meet the benefit promises made during times of galloping inflation. To the 
member, on the other hand, the advantage is that there is no uncertainty 
regarding the exact amount of the benefit to be received upon retirement, as this 
Under-funding occurs when the pension fund's liabilities exceed its assets, while over-funding 
occurs when assets exceed liabilities. 
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is pre-confirmed. 
2.6.2 Difference between pension funds and provident funds 
Beside the above variances between defined-contribution and defined-benefit 
plans there exists another distinction, viz. between pension funds and provident 
funds. 
According to Downie (2003) the fundamental difference between pension funds 
and provident funds centres on how the final payout to the members upon 
retirement is structured under the fund. On retirement, a provident fund's 
members can withdraw the full amount of their benefits as a lump sum cash 
payment. However, in the case of a pension fund a minimum of two thirds of the 
final benefit must be paid in as a pension for the rest of the pensioner's life, while 
a maximum of one-third of the final benefit may be taken as a lump-sum cash 
payment. Even though in this study the two terms (pension fund and provident 
fund) are used interchangeably, it is imperative that the distinction between the 
two is kept in mind. One can, for the purposes of this study, safely use the two 
terms interchangeably as the difference concerns the method of benefit payout 
and not the method of accumulation, which is the core subject matter of this 
study. 
Granted the nature of the difference between the two types of retirement fund, 
one can conclude that the method of accumulation or, put more academically, the 
investment approach to both provident funds and pension funds should be the 
same. Consequently, the available literature on the performance of either fund 
should be applicable to the other. 
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2.7 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Sharpe (2004) positions investment strategy as the key element of any plan 
designed to take into account the needs and circumstances of a particular 
investor, as opposed to just being an approach for short-term trading. This 
positioning is based on the understanding, he argues, that investment is about 
risk and expected returns. Broadly speaking, Sharpe (2004) further argues that 
textbook descriptions of investment strategy have divided investment strategy 
into two types: inefficient strategies and efficient strategies. 
Efficient strategies, Sharpe (2004) argues, are those strategies that provide the 
highest possible expected returns for a higher level of risk. Inefficient strategies, 
on the other hand, are those that incur risk that is not rewarded sufficiently with 
higher expected returns. The job of the financial advisor or investment manager 
is to avoid inefficient strategies and ensure a match between the investor's needs 
and the chosen strategy with its inherent risks. Investment strategy for a 
retirement fund is informed by critically analysing the profile of the members of 
the fund, unmasking their risk profile, and looking at their average age distribution 
as well as their desired returns. 
2.8 INVESTMENT FUND MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
A major factor in defining whether to follow active management or an indexing 
approach, argues Downie (2003), consists in the investor's underlying 
assumptions regarding the efficiency of the market. Investors who believe that 
markets are efficient, adopt passive or index investing strategies that have a low 
portfolio turnover and tend to track the market. Investors who believe they can 
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make better predictions than those reflected in market prices adopt active 
strategies which involve more turnover as predictions change. Highly active 
managers incur high costs in their search for securities that may or may not be 
mispriced. 
The type of management approach that a given retirement fund elects to adopt 
largely depends on the fund's investment strategy. Sharpe (2004) advances that 
a fund that has an aggressive strategy desiring high returns will follow an active 
fund management approach as this approach promises above-average returns. 
On the other hand, if the profile of the members indicates risk aversion, then 
following a passive approach might be the appropriate approach. 
Consequently, the result of the analysis of membership profile plays an important 
part in determining the risk appetite that the fund should have. If a fund largely 
has older members nearing retirement, then that fund would logically adopt a 
more risk-averse approach to investing and take large positions in capital 
preservation products or some other forms of guaranteed products. However if 
the average age is still far from retirement, then the fund would adopt a more 
aggressive approach and take large positions in equities, as the members still 
have some time before retirement. It is important to point out, though, that 
membership risk profiling often reveals a fair distribution between the two 
extreme ends of risk appetite, thus necessitating a more balanced approach. 
Sharpe (2004) states that in cases where funds have on average a membership 
base that has a high risk appetite, an active management approach is often 
chosen. Funds choosing to follow the active management approach are by 
implication of the view that there are opportunities in the market to make 
abnormal profits out of market inefficiencies (that might be identified from time to 
time). For managers of these funds the option of replicating the market index 
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when constructing a portfolio is not an option, granted that they have promised 
the members of their funds returns that exceed the market index. With active 
management the risk of either choosing inefficient strategies or efficient ones is 
more prevalent. In an attempt to maximise returns, fund managers can expose 
the fund to high risk with no corresponding expected returns. 
Fortin and Michelson (2002) reason that the large number of investment 
professionals involved in active fund management seems to suggest that there 
are benefits accruing to supposedly rational investors involved in these funds. 
According to Fortin and Michelson (2002), over the years there has been a 
longstanding discussion over the relative benefits of active versus passive 
management. Elton and Gruber (1996) show that their portfolio of high-alpha11 
actively managed funds outperformed the Vanguard S&P Index fund from 1981 
to 1993. Wermers (2000 cited by Fortin and Michelson, 2002) finds that equity 
mutual funds outperform the market by 1,3 % per year, although expenses and 
transaction costs reduce this benefit to essentially zero. His conclusion is that 
actively managed funds pick stock well enough to cover their costs. 
Fortin and Michelson (2002) argue that there is a large body of research which 
points to the advantages of indexing over active management. Bogle (2000) 
illustrates that an index fund has a 350 basis point advantage over the average 
equity mutual fund due to management expenses, brokerage costs, sales 
charges and tax advantages. Arnold (2002) notes that the Vanguard 500 Index 
fund outperforms the average equity fund and the effect is amplified when taxes 
are considered. Elton and Gruber (1996) ask the relevant question in their study, 
given that there are sufficient index funds to accommodate most investors' risk 
choices, whether the index funds are available at lower cost (compared to active 
funds), and whether the lower cost of index funds means that a combination of 
11 See 2.14.1 for the definition of the term a 
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index funds is likely to outperform an active fund of similar risk. Why select an 
actively managed fund? The studies of Malkiel (1996) and Kuhle and Pope 
(2000) provide the answer to this question. 
Malkiel (1996) notes that over the past 25 years, about 70 % of active equity 
managers have been outperformed by the S&P 500 Stock Index. Gruber (1996) 
and Bogle (2000) also find similar results. This view is also supported by 
Hagstrom (2001). Bogle (2000) advances that the case for selecting an index 
fund as opposed to an actively managed one is so compelling due to the index 
fund's inherent cost advantage. This advantage is also noted by Kuhle and Pope 
(2000). Malkiel (1996) concludes by stating that most investors will be 
considerably better off by purchasing a low expense index fund than by trying to 
select an active fund manager who appears to possess a hot hand. Fortin and 
Michelson (2002) also found that comparison index funds in their study had a 
lower expense ratio compared to their counterparts. Their study concluded that 
on average index funds outperform actively managed funds for most equity and 
all bond fund categories on both a before-tax and after-tax basis. 
Downie (2003) observes in his book that passive management is a relatively new 
concept in the South African asset management industry although it is a tried and 
tested method in the European and the North American markets. This approach 
is favoured for its low level of exposure to downside risk, which more often than 
not haunts risky structures. According to Fortin and Michelson (2002) the low 
level of exposure enjoyed by index funds is achieved at a cost because asset 
managers following this approach aim for average performance. Downie (2003) 
argues that studies have proved that managers who follow this strategy 
religiously and consistently achieve average results, which in the long run end up 
well above average. 
Sharpe (2004) points out that in order to consistently achieve these average 
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results managers must always structure their portfolios accurately so that they 
always track or replicate the index. The upside of passive fund management, 
argue Fortin and Michelson (2002), is that it results in lower management fees 
being levied against the fund as well as lower transaction costs because of lower 
asset turnover. Blake and Board (2000) note that the passive approach is 
favoured by proponents of the efficient market hypothesis, as they believe that no 
one can beat the market consistently and thus conclude that active management 
is an exercise in futility which merely generates unhealthy transaction and 
management costs. 
2.8.1 Benefits and disadvantages of the active fund management approach 
Active fund management has a number of inherent benefits and disadvantages. 
These benefits and disadvantages are listed below: 
2.8.1.1 Benefits of the active fund management approach 
• Diversification - Funds invest in an array of securities, from just a handful 
to hundreds of separate issues, depending on the fund's investment 
objective. This broad exposure helps in reducing (although it does not 
eliminate) the risk of loss from an investment in a single security. 
• Professional Management - an experienced manager ensures the fund's 
investments remain consistent with its investment objectives, whether that 
means tracking the market index or using research and market forecasts 
to actively select securities. 
• Liquidity - one can withdraw one's investment from an actively managed 
fund whenever one wishes to do so, although there could be waiting 
periods with some funds. 
• Convenience - with most actively managed funds, one can obtain 
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information by telephone, by mail or online. 
2.8.1.2 Disadvantages of the active fund management approach 
Notwithstanding the advantages listed above, actively managed funds have 
disadvantages as well. These are listed below: 
No guarantees - the actively managed fund investment, unlike a bank 
deposit, can fall in value. Some funds, however, invest in capital 
preservation funds that guard the capital amount, however their yield 
fluctuates. 
The diversification penalty - diversification may reduce the risk of loss 
from holding a single security, but it also limits the potential for a big score 
if a single security increases dramatically in value. Equally important is the 
fact that diversification does not protect an investor from an overall decline 
in the market if no assets are held offshore. 
Potentially high costs - actively managed funds can be a cost-effective 
way to buy a variety of securities. But in some cases, the efficiencies of 
fund ownership are offset by a combination of steep sales commissions, 
exit and or entry fees, and high operating expenses (management 
expense ratios).12 
12 Management expense ratios are fees charged by nearly all fund's and generally include 
operating expenses such as legal costs, accounting and audit fees, custodian fees, the cost of 
preparing the prospectus document and other administrative expenses. 
- 4 4 -
2.8.2 Benefits and disadvantages of the index fund management 
approach 
An index fund as explained earlier seeks to match the investment performance of 
a specific target index. The index manager does not actively buy and sell 
securities in an effort to beat the market. Rather, the manager simply holds all or 
a representative sample of the securities in the index. 
2.8.2.1 Benefits of index fund management 
• Competitive performance - the vast majority of actively managed funds 
have often failed to outperform comparable market indexes, after costs. An 
index fund manager simply aims to capture market returns of the assets 
making up the targeted index. As a result, fund returns should closely track 
the market returns, less fees. With the added advantages of reduced 
transaction costs and low management fees, index funds can be expected 
to provide very competitive performance over the long term. 
• Broad diversification - Index funds tend to invest in a wide range of 
securities in order to match a market index. As a result, an index fund is 
less exposed to the performance - good or bad - of any one security. 
• Simplicity - index funds take the guesswork out of investing. Fund 
managers do not need to analyse the strategies of competing fund 
managers in an attempt to get to one that can outperform the market. 
• Lower costs - with its lower management fees, and with trading costs kept 
to a minimum, the average index-managed fund costs far less to operate 
than the average actively managed fund. Lower costs mean that more of 
the investor's money is invested. 
• Tax-efficiency - an index fund tends to buy and hold securities for the long 
term. The fund does not buy and sell in an attempt to outperform the 
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market. As a result the fund tends to realise and distribute a (more) 
modest capital gains tax. That means a lower tax liability for the index 
fund's unit holder than one would expect to realise from an actively 
managed fund. 
2.8.2.2 Disadvantages of index fund management 
• Market returns only - indexing is generally a long-term strategy and is not 
about timing markets or picking hot stocks. An index fund does not attempt 
to beat the index it tracks and is expected to provide market returns only. 
If a unit holder is seeking returns that outperform a market index, then he 
or she might be able to achieve this through an actively managed fund as 
opposed to the index fund. 
• Rigid portfolio requirements - a fund that remains fully invested in the 
securities of a selected market index can be expected to follow the market 
index during market downswings (while benefiting fully when markets 
rise). An actively managed fund can buy or sell specific securities during 
times of market volatility, although there is no guarantee that the active 
manager will pick the right securities to buy and sell, in order to achieve 
above market returns. Market timing is very difficult, even for professional 
fund managers. 
2.9 FUND SPLITTING 
Trustees may decide for a number of reasons to split the assets of the fund by 
appointing a number of investment management teams. This practice of fund 
splitting is also practised in the South African retirement fund market. An example 
of a fund using this approach is the Rennies Provident Fund, which for the 2003 
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period had contracted 5 different fund management houses. 
2.9.1 Reasons for fund splitting 
According to Downie (2003) there are a variety of reasons why trustees follow the 
fund-splitting approach, the most prominent being the pursuit of diversification. 
Trustees use fund splitting to spread the risk of poor investment management. In 
actively managed retirement funds where asset managers are in pursuit of 
superior returns, it inevitably happens at times that they temporarily incorrectly 
guess the market resulting in adverse performance. Employing more than one 
manager can, it is argued by proponents of this approach, minimise the short-
term effects of one manager being temporarily incorrect in his forecasts of market 
movements. 
This argument is anchored on the assumption that the forecasts of the managers 
employed will be temporarily negatively correlated in such times of incorrect 
forecasting, thus for this advantage to hold the absence of herding in the 
behaviour of the managers employed is critical. 
The second reason is that splitting enables funds to benefit from specialist skills 
inherent in the diverse pool of managers contracted by the fund (Downie, 2003). 
The argument goes that if the fund's overall objective is the attainment of 
superior returns, then splitting the fund among specialists will ensure better 
results than just employing one management house that specialises in only one 
area and is average in others. The overriding assumption here is that no one-
asset management team can have specialist skills in diverse investment types. 
A third argument, which is deeply grounded in the theory of free-marketeering, is 
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that splitting the fund introduces healthy competition between the different asset 
management teams managing the assets. This competition results in the different 
teams striving to outperform each other and thus creates value for the fund. 
Lastly, it is argued that the interaction of trustees with the different management 
teams also exposes the trustees to different technical approaches and theories, 
thus resulting in an improvement of the trustee's skills levels and the way in 
which they appraise the services of the different management teams. 
2.9.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of fund splitting 
Downie (2003) argues that there are disadvantages with fund splitting, the most 
prominent one being the high management fees associated with fund splitting. 
Granted the rise in management fees, trustees then have an added incentive to 
rigorously appraise the performance of the different asset managers contracted 
by the fund. 
Secondly, the performance of some particular manager may be so poor that it 
drops the average returns of the fund to levels even lower than the index fund. 
Another disadvantage arises from the added time that trustees must take to 
evaluate the performance of more than one asset manager. 
Funds that follow the fund-splitting approach end up exposed to a compounded 
double-agency problem, because policyholders have entrusted trustees with the 
task of running the fund and the trustees have in turn delegated this task to 
different management teams. Downie (2003) cautions that even though trustees 
have delegated the accountability for management, the responsibility for 
management still rests with them. In this sense they have a fiduciary duty to 
examine their decisions in relation to the performance of the fund. Thus trustees 
must from time to time appraise the performance of the delegated fund managers 
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to ensure that they are the best for the job at hand. 
The major advantage, however, is grounded in the theory of diversifying, the 
rationale behind fund-splitting being that superior performing fund managers will 
make up for poorly performing ones within the fund, thereby, it is hoped, 
averaging out the poor performance. Fund splitting is favoured because is 
creates an atmosphere of healthy competition between the different fund 
managers tasked with managing the various portions of the assets of the fund. 
2.10 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS, THE RANDOM WALK THEORY 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON ACTIVE FUND MANAGEMENT 
Fama (1965 cited by Bodie et al, 2002) defines an efficient market as a market 
where there are large numbers of rational profit-maximisers actively competing, 
with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where 
important current information is almost freely available to all participants. In an 
efficient market, Fama (1965 cited by Bodie et al, 2002) argued, competition will, 
on an average, cause the full effects of new information on intrinsic values to be 
reflected instantly in actual prices. Arnold (2002) further notes that the efficient 
market hypothesis presupposes that the prices of securities already reflect all the 
available information and thus offer no opportunities for abnormal profiting 
through asset selection abilities. 
Bodie et al (2002) noted that the efficient market hypothesis concludes that active 
management is just an exercise in futility. This view was championed by Fama 
(1965 cited by Bodie et al, 2002), who advanced that markets quickly self-adjust 
to inefficiencies, consequently eroding any chances of consistently profiting out of 
asset mispricing. 
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The random walk theory deals a further blow to the case for active asset 
management, as it asserts that stock price changes are random and 
unpredictable, thus making it virtually impossible to consistently profit from timing 
security price movements. An unconditional acceptance of the efficient market 
hypothesis and the random walk theory equals a negation of the claim by active 
fund management houses that they can consistently generate superior 
investment returns that far exceed what the market index offers. As pointed out 
by Bodie et al (2002), it is important to note that even the most fanatic 
proponents of the efficient market hypothesis do acknowledge the dependence of 
this hypothesis on the existence of continuous aggressive attempts by active 
fund management houses to profit from asset mispricing. This will result in the 
market quickly adjusting itself, thereby eroding the window of opportunity to 
significantly profit from the asset mispricing, as the knowledge of the mispricing 
becomes common knowledge. 
Ball (1994) notes that there is now a large body of anomalous evidence that at 
least appears to contradict market efficiency. The list of these anomalies includes 
price overreactions which De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue undergo 
corrections, so that the resulting negative correlations in prices appear to create 
profit opportunities for contrarian trading strategies. Shiller (1981 cited by De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985) marshal evidence that proves some anomalies inherent 
in the unconditional acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis. These studies, 
however, do not negate totally the efficiency of the market. 
Bodie et al (2002) argue that to maintain efficiency the market depends on the 
attempts of active fund managers to mine and try to use profitably information 
that is not already reflected in the prices quoted by the market for a given security 
or stock. Bodie et al (2002) note that the research costs involved in mining for 
information that is not already incorporated in security prices are often huge and 
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require a large enough profit margin to justify them. In return for this anticipated 
large enough profit margin active, fund management houses charge investors 
fees with the promise that the profits would be passed on to them in the form of 
superior returns. 
2.11 ACTIVE FUND MANAGEMENT AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Within actively managed funds, the managed portfolios normally exhibit high 
asset turnover due to market timing attempts, which in turn translate into high 
transaction costs. In her study, Kugi (2002 cited by Blake, 2003) notes the 
importance of knowing whether portfolio managers add value to the portfolios 
they manage or whether they merely generate wasteful transaction costs and 
thereby destroy shareholder value. This study emphasises the fact that 
performance evaluation seeks to establish whether superior returns can be 
generated by active managers who are alleged to be better able to collect and 
interpret information that helps forecast securities returns. Again it is worth 
emphasizing here that the resolution of this subject has serious consequences 
for the efficient market hypothesis. If it can be empirically established that active 
portfolio management can generate superior returns through superior use of new 
information and that such a strategy can be replicated, then the efficient market 
hypothesis can be rejected. 
According to Kugi (2002 cited by Blake, 2003), active fund management creates 
transaction costs as managers constantly try and take positions in promising 
stocks or assets. This taking of positions also takes place within index funds 
during portfolio rebalancing interventions; however, the volume of these 
movements is much lower compared to that found in actively managed funds. 
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2.12 ASSET/ LIABILITY MANAGEMENT FOR PENSION FUNDS 
Buehler and Pritsch (2003) affirm that taking and managing risk is part of what 
companies must do to create profits and shareholder value. In their paper they 
advance that McKinsey Consulting analysed the performance of about 200 
leading financial services companies from 1997 to 2002 and found some 150 
cases of significant financial distress for 90 of them13. Put differently, their report 
found that on average every second company was struck at least once, and 
some were more frequently, by a severe risk event. Buehler and Pritsch (2003) 
argue that such events are a reality that management must deal with rather than 
an unlikely tail event. Instead of adopting more value-adding asset management 
processes through effective risk management, most companies have been 
tempted to adopt more risk-averse business models in an attempt to protect 
themselves and their share prices. This trend was acknowledged by William H. 
Donaldson, the chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
when he told an interviewer that he was concerned about a loss of risk-taking 
zeal.14 It is the taking of risks that ultimately creates shareholder value. 
The right response, therefore, is to strike a balance that protects the company 
from the costs of financial distress while allowing space for entrepreneurship. 
Failure to do so will in certain instances result in shareholder value not being 
maximised due to fear of taking high risks. 
Buehler and Pritsch (2003) conclude their argument by stressing that 
management should have the freedom to work in an environment where the 
13 In their analysis they defined financial distress as a bankruptcy filing, a ratings-agency 
downgrade of two or more notches, a sharp decline in earnings (50 % or more below analysts 
consensus estimates six months earlier), or a sharp decline in total returns to shareholders (at 
least 20 % worse than the overall market in any one month). 
14 Financial Times, July 24, 2003. 
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potential rewards of any business decision are consciously weighed against the 
risks and where the company is happy with the level of risk-adjusted returns 
resulting from that decision. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) affirmed that, with 
pension funds just like with companies, the management of risk has to be 
balanced with the desire to maximise shareholder value. Pension funds are not 
immune to the need to manage this business risk in their quest to create 
shareholder value, as Buehler and Pritsch (2003) have pointed out. In the South 
African retirement pension fund industry the importance of the point made by 
Buehler and Pritsch (2003) is immediately evidenced by the existence of 
Regulation 28. 
Downie (2003) points out that pension funds at times supplement the prudent 
investment requirements imposed by Regulation 28 with further management 
constraints aimed at managing the fund's risk exposure. This level of caution is 
informed mainly by the respective fund's average membership age profile or 
benefit payout considerations. If the average age profile of the members of the 
fund is nearing retirement, the fund would want to maintain a high level of liquidity 
and lower its liabilities, given that it anticipates paying out benefits in the near 
future. 
Conversely, if the average age is far from retirement, the fund might want to 
compromise liquidity and hold as much of its assets as permissible under 
Regulation 28 in illiquid assets which offer higher returns than their liquid 
counterparts. Depending on whether the fund is a defined-benefit plan (DB plan) 
or a defined-contribution plans (DC plan), the responsibility of ensuring a balance 
between assets and liability rests with either the employer (in the case of DB 
plans) or with the employees (in the case of DC plans). Further, depending on 
the balance, the DB plan can be either under-funded or over-funded. 
Using the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) risk management methodology, 
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Bogentoft, Romeijn and Uryasev (2001) concluded in their study that risk 
management has a tremendous impact on asset/liability management in the 
pension fund industry. Downie (2003) reasoned that, since pension funds have a 
deferred liability to their members, their need to meet their obligations has a 
direct impact on their asset management decisions. In this regard, liquidity 
conditions as stipulated under Regulation 28 come to mind. Sharpe (2004) 
advances that when choosing an appropriate investment strategy, understanding 
the representative investor's risk appetite and liquidity requirements should be 
the first considerations. This assertion is grounded on the belief that asset/liability 
management is influenced by the respective fund's risk profile and liquidity 
requirements. 
According to Bogentoft et al (2001), the need to manage the pension fund's 
assets/liabilities is informed by the desire to minimise the need to increase 
premiums from plan sponsors or from the active employees who are members of 
the fund, in order to ensure that the fund is not terminally under-funded. 
Bogentoft et al (2001) further argue that the challenge facing fund managers 
consists in setting, at each decision moment, a suitable contribution rate and a 
suitable investment strategy for the funds available to the pension fund. 
The management of the balance between assets and liabilities is a much more 
critical management element with defined-benefit plans more than it is for 
defined-contribution plans. Since sponsors of a defined-benefit plan have made a 
commitment to the plan's members, they have to ensure that the plan is always 
fully funded. Blake (2003) notes in his paper that the hunt for correlation between 
assets and liabilities will, given the Myners Report (2001), become an important 
defining factor in terms of how pension fund assets are invested in the UK.15 The 
15 See: The Myners Report (Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review), March 
2001. 
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report notes that asset allocation and performance objectives of pension funds in 
the UK in general bear little or no resemblance to the pension fund's long-term 
obligations. The performance targets set by pension funds, Myners (2001) notes, 
have more to do with beating benchmarks with no direct or clarified link to the 
long term obligations of the fund. Myners (2001) recommends that defined-
benefit funds should adopt a strategic asset allocation approach that minimises a 
loss function surplus and contribution risks.16,17 
2.13 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION 
Sharpe (2004) prefaces his paper with the assertion that investment is about risk 
and expected returns. Sodeyama and Yano (2004) demonstrate in their study 
that the successful management of this risk and of expected returns is a function 
of efficient portfolio construction. Portfolio construction in turn is largely 
influenced by the prevailing portfolio constraints facing the fund, as well as by the 
given fund's investment strategy. 
As quoted earlier, Sharpe (2004) noted that textbook descriptions of the 
investment process divide investment strategies into two types: Inefficient 
strategies that incur risk that is not rewarded sufficiently with higher expected 
returns, and efficient strategies that provide the highest possible expected returns 
for a given level of risk. 
Using stochastic modelling Blake (2003) demonstrated that an efficient strategy 
16 Surplus risk is minimised by ensuring full funding on a continuous basis and matching as 
closely as possible the volatility of the assets and liabilities. The volatility of the liabilities depends 
on the volatilities of real earnings growth, mortality, inflation, and interest rates. 
7 Contribution risk deals with the volatility of contributions into the pension scheme. It can be 
lowered by investing in lower volatility assets, but at a cost of raising average contributions. 
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for the accumulation phase in a defined-contribution plan is one that limits the 
range of returns that are credited to the plan members' account. This gives 
members smoothed returns while they are young. Like Sharpe (2004), Blake 
(2003) further argued against what he termed reckless conservatism. To 
ascertain the true level of underperformance or overperformance of the fund it is 
imperative that the results obtained be compared to a suitable passive 
benchmark. According to Blake (2003) this will enable the trustees of the fund to 
make a sound decision of electing either to follow a passive investment strategy 
or to continue making use of the services of active fund managers during the 
accumulation phase.18 
According to Sharpe (2004) a key job of the fund manager is to avoid inefficient 
strategies. This job requires the estimates of risks and expected returns for 
individual securities, asset classes, industries, countries and currencies amongst 
other considerations. Sharpe (2004) further pointed out that this job of avoiding 
inefficient strategies also requires the estimates of correlations that indicate the 
extent to which such investments are likely to move together or separately. 
According to Sharpe (2004), methods of finding efficient strategies and projecting 
their results come from the field of financial economics known as portfolio theory. 
Sharpe (2004) argued that in an efficient market the best portfolio for a 
representative investor will include all the marketable securities available in the 
world, in proportion to their market values.19 According to Sharpe (2004), 
proponents of the efficient market hypothesis (those who assume that the market 
is efficient) adopt passive or index investing strategies. The afore-mentioned 
18 See appendix A for a description of the stochastic model. 
19 The prototypical representative investor is a conglomerate of all investors, rich and poor from 
every country; with those having more influence on security prices (such as the richer) counted 
more heavily that those with less influence. A world market portfolio would for example have 1% 
of all the shares of Microsoft, 1 % of each type of bond issued by the South African government, 
and so on. 
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strategies involve low portfolio turnover and tend to track the market. According 
to Kahn (2000), portfolio construction for funds following the passive 
management approach consists in the main of replicating the market index. Once 
a portfolio mirroring the market index has been constructed, all that is left for 
managers of these funds is constant rebalancing of the fund to track the 
movements of the market index. According to Sharpe (2004), the investment 
profile of members of these funds is that of risk aversion. Since the indexing 
strategy tracks the market, it can hardly be classified as an inefficient strategy as 
it achieves an acceptable balance between risk and return. 
According to Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann (1998), the remarkable work of 
Markowitz provided a technique commonly known as the mean-variance 
analysis. This technique defines how, for a given set of assets, portfolio weights 
could be calculated to produce a portfolio that could maximise expected returns 
for a given level of risk. The set of portfolios produced using this technique 
defines what is known as the "efficient frontier". The implications of this technique 
are that if one had a portfolio that plotted below the efficient frontier, optimally 
rebalancing the portfolio could either increase the portfolio's expected returns 
without increasing its risk or decrease the portfolio's risk without compromising 
the expected returns. Blake et al (1998) point out that the shape of the frontier 
depends on the level of correlation between the assets held. Asset allocation 
using the Markowitz mean-variance methodology is not only a return-maximising 
discipline but rather a return-optimising discipline. Thus it is designed to 
maximise returns in the context of acceptable risk. The primary purpose of asset 
allocation in general is to reduce risk through efficient diversification through 
allocating assets amongst different asset classes and management styles that do 
not move in tandem. See figure 2.4 for a graphical illustration of assets that do 
not move in tandem (negatively correlated assets). 
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Figure 2.4: Negatively correlated assets 
January February 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
March April 
Period 
The figure shows two stocks, A and B, which are negatively correlated with each 
other. For these types of assets a loss to the one is a gain to the other. A typical 
example is that of assets underlined by operations in the Tropical Island market 
vis-a-vis stocks underlined by operations in skiing resorts. When Asset A 
performs well, Asset B performs badly. To optimise the theory of diversification, 
fund managers have to find negatively correlated stocks in order to spread risk. 
There are also stocks that are positively correlated; these are exemplified by 
figure 2.5 on the next page. 
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Figure 2.5: Positively correlated assets 
40% r — 
January February April May 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
Positively correlated stocks move in tandem; a decline in asset X presupposes a 
decline in asset Y as well. These types of assets are to be avoided when seeking 
to optimise diversification and reduce portfolio risk. 
Apart from risk and return considerations, portfolio construction is also influenced 
by the investment mandate given by trustees to fund managers. For instance, if a 
given pension fund has an inclination toward responsible investing, this 
inclination will be reflected in the chosen investment strategy. In turn, the strategy 
would dictate the type of assets that the fund can have in its portfolio make-up. 
According to Sodeyama and Yano (2004), there are various constraints that fund 
managers following the active portfolio management approach have to face when 
constructing their portfolios. These constraints are either limitations on the 
number of issues held in a portfolio, restrictions on short sales, or upper/lower 
limits of holding weights. These constraints to some extent limit their choices and 
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ability to construct what they deem to be optimal portfolios. Sodeyama and Yano 
(2004) found in their study that these constraints on portfolio construction 
sometimes have a negative effect on performance which compromises the value 
of active portfolio management. 
2.14 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Following the research paper by Jensen (1968 cited by Oldfield and Page, 2002), 
a number of researchers have advocated the use of sophisticated statistical 
procedures in an effort to refine performance analysis. These researchers 
analysed the market timing and stock selection ability of professional fund 
managers. Oldfield and Page (2002) gave a summary of findings from the more 
frequently quoted research into this area (see table 2.2). 













Sharpe, Treynor & 
Jensen measures 
Varying market risk 
over time & CAPM 
Extension of the 
1979 analysis to 
examine selectivity 
& timing issues 
Data analysed 
115 United States 
mutual funds from 
1955 to 1964 
123 United States 
mutual funds from 
1960 to 1969 
49 United States 
mutual fund's from 
1960 to 1971 
37 United States 
funds from 1960 to 
1976 
Results 
No funds significantly 
outperformed a buy-and-hold 
strategy 
Majority of funds did not 
perform as well as NYSE 
Results indicated a large 
number of funds engage in 
market timing activities due to 
multiple levels of beta risk 
14 funds had overall timing 
performance but none were 
statistically significant. 23 had 
overall selectivity performance 
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116 United States 
funds from 1968 to 
1980 
Monthly returns of 
67 United States 
funds from 1971 to 
1979 
Quarterly returns of 
43 United States 
funds 
Quarterly holding 
period returns on 
274 US mutual 
funds using actual 
portfolio holdings 
from 1974 to 1984 
Monthly returns on 
93 US mutual 
funds from 1977 to 
1984 
Monthly returns on 
30 United Kingdom 
mutual funds from 
1977 to 1984 
Quarterly 
proportional 
holdings of 155 US 
funds from 1974 to 
1984 
Results 
but only 5 were significant 
11 significantly positive and 8 
significantly negative measures 
of selectivity ability. 3 
significantly positive and 9 
significantly negative measures 
of timing ability 
4 funds exhibited statistically 
significant timing skills while 5 
funds exhibited statistically 
significant selection skills and 
of these 3 were negative 
Approximately 30% of the 
funds exhibited selectivity, 19% 
were found to have random 
betas, 14% had significantly 
negative timing performance 
Evidence of superior 
performance especially among 
the aggressive growth 
portfolios 
Some evidence of superior 
selection and timing ability 
Majority of funds offered 
investors significantly higher 
risk adjusted returns 
Funds achieved abnormal 







Extension of the 
methodology by 





holdings of 16 
Israeli unit trusts 
Results 
No evidence of timing or 
selection ability found 
Source: Oldfield and Page (2002). 
As can be discerned from table 2.2 above, there seems to be a trend in the 
empirical evidence for professional fund managers to exhibit either positive or 
negative abilities when more sophisticated methodologies are applied. A closer 
analysis of table 2.2 reveals surprising results from the studies by Grinblatt and 
Titman (1993 cited by Oldfield and Page, 2002) and Black, Fraser and Power 
(1992 cited by Oldfield and Page, 2002) which established that the majority of the 
funds they analysed managed to earn above-average returns. 
Notwithstanding the results of the studies shown in table 2.2, active fund 
managers pride themselves on their ability to consistently secure above-average 
returns for the funds they manage. This is in line with the findings of the Grinblatt 
& Titman (1993 cited by Oldfield and Page, 2002) and Black et al (1992 cited by 
Oldfield and Page, 2002) studies. The Grinbald and Titman (1993 cited by 
Oldfield and Page, 2002) study noted that this sense of self-aggrandisement is 
evidenced by the sometimes hefty charges that investment management houses 
levy on members of the funds they manage. Taking that into account, it is only 
fair for members of actively managed investment funds to expect above-average 
returns from their held positions in those funds (Blake and Board, 2000). 
Oldfield and Page (2002) argue that any superior performance by a professional 
fund manager can result from two aspects of investment strategy. Firstly, the 
manager may have superior ability in forecasting when to move in or out of a 
particular segment of the market. Elton and Gruber (1991 cited by Oldfield and 
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Page, 2002) define this forecasting ability as being the decision to move funds 
between high-risk assets and low-risk assets. According to Oldfield and Page 
(2002) this definition is consistent with security market line analysis and the 
perception of a single systematic risk factor influencing high risk asset returns. 
Secondly, Oldfield and Page (2002) argue that a fund manager may have 
superior ability in selecting securities within a particular segment of the market. In 
this context they are referring to the manager's forecasting ability with respect to 
firm-specific risk factors as opposed to industry-specific risk factors. 
Prior to judging performance, it is important to identify clearly what the objectives 
of a given pension fund are in view of its responsibilities to its policyholders 
(Downie, 2003). There must be a clear investment mandate against which a 
given fund manager can be judged upon on a periodical basis. Ritchie (1983 
cited by Blake et al, 1998) cautions that ex-post returns achieved by a fund 
manager cannot be judged to have been good or bad without considering the 
stated ex-ante objectives as well as other dynamics or random factors that 
influenced performance. This point is critical in ensuring meaningful performance 
evaluation (Downie, 2003). Discounting for constraints imposed on feasible 
solutions to a problem that fund managers face is another important 
consideration when evaluating performance. Normally these constraints are 
influenced by the differing investment policies embraced by different funds, by 
trustee intervention and by other random factors. 
Investment fund managers have to make investment decisions in line with their 
investment mandates and can miss out on opportunities if these opportunities are 
deemed to be in conflict with the mandate given. Trustees can, for example, 
mandate the fund manager to invest a certain portion of funds in stocks that are 
deemed to be from socially responsible organisations. If his choice had been 
unrestrained by such a mandate, the manager could possibly have selected a far 
better performing stock to invest that specified portion in. Engstrom (2004) 
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argues that when these constraints exist, they could have a restraining effect on 
the fund manager's stock selection abilities, thus compromising his overall 
performance. Therefore, the constraints imposed by Regulation 28 of the 
Pension Fund's Act of South Africa, as well as the restrictions that trustees 
sometimes place on fund managers, should be systematically factored-in when 
measuring or rating pension fund performance. In cases where there are 
restrictions placed on fund managers beyond those stipulated by the Act, it 
becomes difficult to take the given fund's performance results and use them as a 
genuine reflector of the managers ability to produce outstanding results (Sharpe, 
1991). 
The current literature that is available in South Africa on the performance of 
different investment vehicles that use pooled funds, provides investors with 
periodic performance rankings but fails to provide them with any indication to 
what degree the results achieved were due to a given manager's abilities 
(Oldfield and Page, 2002). In their study of the performance of South African unit 
trusts, Oldfield and Page (2002) suggested that an assessment of the timing and 
selection skills of the managers of unit trusts could prove extremely useful to 
investors attempting to maximise their wealth using that type of investment 
medium. Earlier, Fama (1972 cited by Brinson et al, 1986) and Jensen (1972 
cited by Brinson et al, 1986) also argued for a finer breakdown of performance in 
which one attempts to isolate the stock-selection as well as the market-timing 
abilities of portfolio managers. 
Bagot and Armitage (2003) value-based performance analysis stresses the 
importance of the manager's contribution to an investor's holding in a multi-
interval context. Their study establishes striking and important differences 
between the value-based approach to performance analysis vis-a-vis the 
traditional industry standard method, which uses a time-weighted rate of returns 
(TWR). The value-based approach enables one to correctly do an attribution 
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analysis and correctly measure the value added to shareholders, and 
consequently provides a better understanding of the manager's contribution. 
Ferson and Warther (1996 cited by Oldfield and Page, 2002) introduced the 
concept of conditional performance measurement, which incorporated lagged 
market indicators into the analysis of investment performance. This dynamic 
approach factored-in the variance of the economic conditions and the risks by 
which fund managers are faced. This concept also addresses the major practical 
problems that have marred performance evaluation for years (Oldfield and Page, 
2002). 
2.14.1 Traditional performance measures 
According to Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986), performance evaluation of 
pooled assets can be traced back to the 1960s. Pioneers of varying evaluation 
techniques were Treynor (1965 cited by Engstrom, 2004), Sharpe (1966 cited by 
Engstrom, 2004), and Jensen (1968 cited by Engstrom, 2004). According to 
Engstrom (2004), Jensen's alpha has become the most widely used measure in 
academic literature. Jensen's alpha is measured as the intercept from a 
regression on the returns, in excess of the risk-free rate of the managed portfolio, 
on the excess returns of a benchmark portfolio. Engstrom (2004) argues that this 
measure is known to suffer from a statistical bias when fund managers 
successfully time the market. The implication is that successful timers can be 
assigned a negative performance. In response to this statistical bias problem, 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) proposed the positive period weighting measure 
which is an alternative measure that does not suffer from this statistical bias. 
Further developments in the literature have concerned the choice of benchmark 
to use when evaluating performance. Lehmann and Modest (1987 cited by 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) demonstrated that performance evaluation is 
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significantly affected by the choice of benchmark model. Elton et al (1993 cited 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) also demonstrated the importance of choosing the 
correct factor in the Jensen single-factor model by extending the model used in 
Ippolito (1989 cited by Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) into a multifactor model and 
showing that results are reversed. Engstrom (2004) notes that the Jensen 
measure fails to account for time-varying expected risk and returns, due to its use 
of historical returns when estimating expected performance. Engstrom (2004) 
demonstrated that Ferson and Schadt (1996 cited by Engstrom, 2004) extend the 
traditional measure of performance by using predetermined information variables. 
According to Engstrom (2004) the conditional performance measurement allows 
for time-varying expected returns and risk. According to Engstrom (2004) the 
Ferson-Schadt measure is obtained by the regression: 
Rtt - RQ = a, + fin (Rbt - Rft) + P'u qt-i (Rbt - RB) + eu 
The deviation a; from the benchmark model, if it is positive, can be interpreted as 
superior performance. The beta coefficient measures the exposure to the 
benchmark and is a measure of the fund's systematic risk. Each information 
variable C/M has zero mean. 
2.14.2 New Performance Measures 
According to Engstrom (2004), previous performance evaluation measures have 
focused mainly on aggregate portfolio performance. Based on the methods 
developed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981 cited 
by Engstrom, 2004), performance has been decomposed into selectivity and 
market timing. Engstrom (2004) further extended the literature by decomposing 
This was achieved by adapting the Asset Pricing Theory to performance evaluation. 
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performance into terms corresponding to the fund manager's strategic and 
tactical decisions using replicating portfolios.21 Grinblatt and Titman (1989) 
constructed a similar hypothetical portfolio based on observed portfolio weights. 
According to Engstrom (2004), the first measure that can be computed using the 
replicating portfolio is the difference between the fund's returns and the returns 
on the replicating portfolio. This difference can be interpreted as the value (in 
terms of returns) created by the fund manager's active decisions. Engstrom 
(2004) argues that the implication of a positive returns value (RV) of active 
portfolio management is that the manager has sold inferior assets in comparison 
with the assets bought. 
According to Engstrom (2004), the fund's replicating portfolio allows for an 
evaluation of the fund manager's strategic and tactical decisions on a risk-
adjusted basis. The performance measure of strategic decisions is obtained by 
evaluating the replicating portfolio using Jensen's alpha measure. The 
unconditional strategic performance is estimated by the intercept in the 
regression: 
where RRit is the return on the replicating portfolio of fund i at time t. In addition, 
the subscript S refers to strategic decisions; thus as, refers to the performance of 
the strategic decision and fiSi refers to the risk in the strategic portfolio. Moreover, 
Ru - Rv refers to the returns on the benchmark in excess of the risk free asset at 
time /. - Similarly, the performance of the manager's tactical decision is computed 
by evaluating the fund's returns in excess of the replicating portfolio. Tactical 
21 The performance of strategic decisions captures a manager's ability to make long-term 
investment decisions that last for at least one year. Strategic decisions are measured by taking a 
snapshot of the portfolio and evaluate a passive strategy of this portfolio (replicating portfolio). 
Tactical performance, on the other hand, captures a manager's ability to make short-term 
investment decisions during the year. Tactical performance is measured through evaluating how 
the mid-year decisions affect risk and returns in the portfolio. 
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performance is estimated by the intercept in the regression: 
Ru - Rut = «T; +fir, (Rbt - Ra) + eTU 
where Rit RRU is the return on the zero investment portfolio, or the returns on 
fund i in excess of its replicating portfolio. In addition, the subscript T refers to 
tactical decisions; thus aTi refers to the performance of the tactical decision and 
fiji refers to the risk in the tactical portfolio. According to Engstrom (2004), the 
evaluation of both the fund managers' strategic decisions and of their tactical 
decisions can be computed in a conditional setting, following Ferson and Schadt 
(1996 cited by Engstrom, 2004). This allows for time-varying expected returns 
and risk. 
2.14.3 Performance evaluation - from traditional measurements to new 
measures 
Having established the case for performance evaluation, it is critical to note that 
there are intrinsic questions regarding performance evaluation such as: 
• What benchmark should one use when measuring performance? 
• How should one account for the risk relating to the different asset classes 
held in the given portfolio held by the fund? and 
• How does one attribute performance to either value-creative or value-
destructive managers? 
These questions have been the driving force behind the development of 
performance evaluation theory. In the following sections these questions are 
considered in turn. 
- 6 8 -
2.14.3.1 What benchmark should be used when measuring performance? 
According to Bagot and Armitage (2003), the use of a performance benchmark is 
omnipresent in portfolio performance appraisal. The benchmark enables the rate 
of return achieved by a fund over a particular period to be broken down into 
several components, consisting of the rate of return on the benchmark and of 
incremental rates which capture the effects of active management. Fama (1972 
cited by Bodie et al, 2002) was first in presenting this method of analysis in the 
context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Usage of a correct 
performance benchmark is critical in performance appraisal. 
Oldfield and Page (2002) stress the importance of using a suitable benchmark 
when assessing performance since the benchmark serves as a yardstick for 
expressing a view on performance. Using an incorrect benchmark might lead to 
incorrect conclusions in terms of whether the returns posted are acceptable or 
not. If for example an aggressive portfolio is compared to a moderate benchmark 
in terms of risk, one might conclude that the aggressive portfolio has 
outperformed the benchmark thereby incorrectly overlooking the difference in the 
risk profile of the two portfolios. 
Roll (1978 cited by Bagot and Armitage, 2003) notes that benchmark inefficiency 
is a central theme for both the theoretical and the empirical literature on 
performance evaluation, because of the difficulty in distinguishing benchmark 
inefficiency from abnormal performance. Lehman and Modest (1987 cited by 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) and Elton et al (1993 cited Grinblatt and Titman, 
1989) found that the measured performance of US equity mutual funds can 
depend critically on the benchmark used in the analysis. Elton et al (1993 cited 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) and Ferson and Schadt (1996 cited by Engstrom, 
2004) highlighted some of the mis-specification problems associated with 
performance evaluation that arise when the funds under consideration hold 
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assets that are excluded from the benchmark index. 
According to Bagot and Armitage (2003), the importance of choosing a correct 
benchmark when seeking to determine what value the fund manager has added, 
lies in the fact that the managed fund's rate of return is explained as the return on 
the benchmark, plus the difference for taking more or less risk, plus the 
difference due to stock selection abilities. Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) 
re-defined this analysis in line with industry practice as follows: the benchmark is 
a passive portfolio with an asset allocation chosen by the investor, and the rate of 
returns on the managed fund is explained as the returns on the benchmark, plus 
the difference due to stock selection. Brinson ef a/ (1991 cited by Bagot and 
Armitage, 2003), Allen (1991 cited by Bagot and Armitage, 2003), Ankrim and 
Hensel (1994 cited by Bagot and Armitage, 2003) have since extended this 
framework to identify the incremental rates of return from risk-positioning within 
asset classes and from currency selection. 
An interesting development in the literature is performance measurement without 
general benchmarks. Grinblatt and Titman (1993) measure performance by 
multiplying the twelve month change in portfolio weight by the following month's 
returns on that stock.22 Another evaluation approach that escapes the benchmark 
in efficiency risk is the value-based method advocated by Bagot and Armitage 
(2003). 
They compute the portfolio change measure by using both 1s quarter and 4 quarter lagged 
portfolio weights. However, they focus on the measures from the 4th quarter lagged portfolio 
weights setting since 1 quarter lagged portfolio weights only generate measures close to zero. 
This might be due to the fact that the funds do not change their portfolios very much within one 
quarter. 
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2.14.3.2 How to account for risk relating to the different asset classes held 
in the given portfolio held by the fund? 
According to Akiniolire and Smit (2003), conventional theories of performance 
evaluation dictate that returns must be adjusted for risk before they can be 
compared. The simplest and most popular way to adjust returns for the portfolio 
risk is to compare rates of returns with those of other funds with similar 
characteristics. This approach, groups similar funds into a universe of like assets, 
then the time-weighted average returns of each fund within the universe are 
ordered, and each portfolio manager receives a ranking. 
According to Bodie et al (2002), this form of comparison is a useful first step in 
evaluating performance. Akiniolire and Smit (2003) note that such rankings can 
be misleading because within a particular universe some managers may 
concentrate on particular subgroups such that portfolio characteristics are not 
truly comparable. Risk-adjusted methods of fund performance evaluation using 
mean-variance criteria were published during the same time as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. Akiniolire and Smit (2003) note that currently there are different 
risk-adjusted measures commonly used for performance evaluation; these are 
Sharpe's measure, Treynor's measure and Jensen's measure. 
According to Akiniolire and Smit (2003), Sharpe's measure divides average 
portfolio excess returns over the sample period by the standard deviation of 
returns over that period. It measures the reward to total volatility trade-off. 
Sharpe's measure: rB - rf 
where rp is the return of the portfolio, p; n is the risk-free rate, and op is the total 
risk of the same portfolio. 
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Treynor's measure also evaluates excess returns per unit of risk, but it uses 
systematic risk instead of total risk. 
Treynor's measure: ra - rf 
A 
where rp is the returns of the portfolio, p; n is the risk-free rate and fip is the beta of 
the portfolio. 
Jensen's measure, on the other hand, measures the average return on the 
portfolio over and above that predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model, given 
the portfolio's beta and the average market returns. Jensen's measure is the 
portfolio's alpha value. A positive value denotes a portfolio whose returns are 
consistently greater than those implied by its level of systematic risk, and thus 
denotes superior performance. In a similar manner, Akiniolire and Smit (2003) 




The M2 measure of performance is a variant of Sharpe's measure; it was 
introduced by Modigliani and Modigliani (1997 cited by Akiniolire and Smit, 2003). 
This measure focuses on total volatility as a measure of risk, but its risk-adjusted 
measure of performance has the easy interpretation of a differential return 
relative to the benchmark index. 
The downside of all the above measures includes their tendency to lower the 
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rating of managers who do not beat the index, and also the intrinsic problems 
arising from the assumption of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
Ferson and Warther (1996 cited by Engstrom, 2004) and Ferson and Schadt 
(1996 cited by Engstrom, 2004) advocate the use of a conditional performance 
evaluation approach to address the limitations of the three methods discussed 
above. With this method, only managers who correctly use more information than 
is generally publicly available are considered to have potentially superior ability. 
The conditional model uses the following equation for the fund returns: 
RPt = a + b0 RMt + 6, [RM, * {DY)tA] + b2[(RMt)*(TS)t.i]+ st 
According to Akiniolire and Smit (2003) the above specification adds the dividend 
yield (DY) and the term structure of interest rates (TS) as two additional 
parameters to the regression equation traditionally used to estimate the 
unconditional alpha. 
2.14.3.3 How does one attribute performance to either value creators or 
value destroyers? 
Traditional approaches employed to measure the performance of funds have 
more often than not been marred with incompatibility to the task at hand. A 
popular tendency has been to rate funds according to raw ex-post returns as 
opposed to doing so using risk-adjusted rate-of-return indicators (either ex-ante 
or ex-post). In certain cases, even when the risk-adjusted rate of returns is used, 
the performance measurement tended to be purely an arithmetic exercise where 
returns are crudely compared for variance, with no accompanying effort to 
unmask the key drivers of the variances in returns. 
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In response to this shortcoming, academics have developed performance 
attribution analysis as a method of unmasking key performance drivers or value 
destroyers (Lambert, 1998). By unmasking performance drivers, this method of 
analysis seeks to add to the wide array of methods whose aim is to determine 
whether there is an affirmative case for active portfolio management or not. 
Bagot and Armitage (2003) argue that policyholders belonging to retirement 
funds are not too much concerned with the fund manager's turnover rate; for 
them the all-important question is: What has the manager done for them, given 
their initial investment and the cash inflows they have injected into the fund along 
the way? 
Bagot and Armitage (2003) propose that when investors want to ascertain a 
manager's contribution to the value of their investment, attribution analysis 
provides a better understanding of the manager's contribution. They present a 
value-based method of analysis which, they argue, enables precise attribution 
analysis as opposed to the traditional use of TWR's (time weighted rate of 
returns). With the value-based method the manager's contribution is measured 
by the difference between the final market value of the investors' holding in the 
fund, with its associated cash flows over time, and the final value of the 
equivalent holding in the fund's benchmark. The major attraction of this approach 
is that performance evaluation using values is advantageous in cases where 
there is more than one interval under evaluation. 
According to Bagot and Armitage (2003), in a multi-interval context with 
intervening cash flows between start and finish, we cannot measure the 
manager's contribution to the value of the portfolio using TWRs, hence attribution 
analysis cannot be done correctly. Bagot and Armitage (2003) argue that the 
results of the analysis for the whole portfolio are no longer applicable to different 
investors in the portfolio. Even if there are no intervening cash flows, attribution 
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analysis using TWRs will be inexact unless the constituent asset classes held by 
the portfolio and its benchmark are identical in every interval. 
The value-based method, argue Bagot and Armitage (2003), measures the 
manager's contribution by the difference between the final market value of the 
investor's holding in the fund, with its associated cash flows over time, and the 
final value of the equivalent holding in the fund's benchmark. The value-based 
method is a form of money weighting in that the impact of the manager's interval-
specific decisions on the final value of the holding is positively related to the 
preceding cash flows made by the investor. Bagot and Armitage (2003) conclude 
their study by stating that performance evaluation in terms of values is 
advantageous if there is more than one interval. According to Bagot and 
Armitage (2003) it enables attribution analysis to be conducted precisely and 
transparently, and it enables each investor to be provided with a customised 
report of the manager's contribution to his or her holding. 
There are two major drawbacks, however, with the results generated by this 
method of analysis. First, the method does not present results in a manner that 
can be immediately compared with the rates achieved by other funds (i.e. rate of 
returns). Secondly, the results, whether expressed as values or as percentages, 
may not be appropriate for use in an assessment of the manager's skill. 
However, the value-based analysis enables the manager's contribution to the 
fund and to the holdings of individual members to be analysed in a correct way. 
2.14.4 Relationship between performance evaluation and fund 
management 
The pension asset management policy significantly affects the future returns of a 
fund (DB plan) and therefore the contributions to be made by the firm. 
Understanding the incentives of pension fund managers helps us to predict asset 
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allocation decisions and fund performances better. Arnott (1997 cited by Bagot 
and Armitage, 2003) advances that performance evaluation is indispensable to 
hiring fund managers, checking their performance, and firing them if necessary. 
Asthana and Lipka (2002 cited by Bagot and Armitage, 2003) note that both 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plan sponsors are increasingly 
interested in establishing performance-related termination thresholds for 
investment managers. Managers are dismissed when they perform below the 
applicable benchmark. A major criterion to judge the pension fund manager's 
performance is the returns earned by his or her pension asset portfolio. Higher 
returns imply lower employer contributions to the defined benefit pension fund in 
the future. For higher expected returns, fund managers have to invest in high risk 
portfolios and on the efficient frontier. Most sponsoring firms establish fund 
management policies that state the desirable risk-return profiles for their pension 
funds. These policies are typically guidelines, and fund managers have adequate 
freedom to determine the risk-return profile of their portfolios. 
In their study, Asthana and Lipka (2002 cited by Bagot and Armitage, 2003) find 
that dismal performance prompts managers to reallocate their assets in the 
subsequent periods. This result persists even after they control for riskiness of 
the asset portfolio, firm and plan sizes, funded status, profitability, leverage, and 
age distribution of participants. Asthana and Lipka (2002 cited by Bagot and 
Armitage, 2003) observe that the actions of the managers result in improved 
portfolio performances even after controlling for investment risk and the mean-
reversion phenomenon of asset returns. Further, they observe that the market 
responds negatively to pension asset reallocations to high-risk portfolios. Their 
study observed that some calculated interventions on the side of fund managers, 
does affect performance either positively or negatively, which necessitates 
performance evaluation and review. 
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2.14.5 Performance evaluation and its impact on management fees 
Determining the affirmative case of superior performance by active fund 
managers is critical, given that active fund managers pride themselves on their 
ability to generate superior returns. In line with this promise they collect 
substantial fees in certain cases, as compensation for their alleged ability to 
return to member's superior interest on funds invested. 
Further, as Kugi (2002 cited by Blake and Board, 2000) argued in her study, 
isolating superior managers from their poor performing counterparts can also 
help improve portfolio managers' compensation system. In some countries like 
the UK and South Africa where the mutual fund industry is not as developed as 
the US, the fee structures in operation appear to provide a strong disincentive to 
undertake real active management which seeks to add value for shareholders. 
This is possible because although fund managers are set the objective of adding 
value, their fees are generally related to year-end asset values and not directly to 
performance (Blake and Board, 2000). 
According to Blake and Board (2000) there are essentially a number of bases on 
which pension plan charges can be levied; however, these can be broadly 
categorised as charges imposed on contributions and charges imposed on fund 
value. 
Charges imposed on contributions can either be: 
• Entry charges, which are either related to, or independent of, the size of 
the contributions, or 
• Regular (periodic) charges, either related to, or independent of, the size of 
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contributions. 
On the other hand, charges imposed on the fund value can either be regular 
charges based on interim value, or exit charges based on redemption (i.e. 
terminal, transfer or paid-up) value.23 
In support of the above, Blake et al (1998) argue that genuine ex ante ability 
which translates into superior ex post performance, increases the base used for 
calculating management fees. According to Blake et al (1998), this incentive is 
not very strong as active management subjects the manager to nontrivial risks, 
given that even the returns achieved by a truly superior fund manager will often 
be negative and sometimes large as well. Blake et al (1998) then conclude that 
the potential consequences of underperformance (failure to renew the mandate) 
arising from poor luck far outweigh the prospective benefits from active 
management (a slightly higher fee) for all but the most certain security selection 
or market-timing opportunities. 
In an earlier study conducted to measure added value in the pension fund 
industry, Blake and Board (2000) found little correlation between the fees 
charged by funds and their actual performance. Blake and Board (2000) argue 
strongly in favour of a wider usage of performance-related charges by pension 
funds, which will reward superior performance while penalising poor performers. 
Blake and Board (2000) also unmask the effects of front-load charges on 
investable assets through use of two conventional approaches that measure the 
The terminal value referred to here is the value of the accumulated fund on the retirement date 
of the policyholder. On that date, the accumulated fund is usually used to buy a life annuity from 
an insurance company in return for a single fixed charge. 
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reduction in yield (RiY) as well as the reduction in contributions (RiC). 
According to Blake and Board (2000), the higher charges lower the net 
contributions invested, and therefore lower the fund's maturity value which in turn 
results in a larger reduction in yield. The structure of these charges has a 
depressive effect on fund performance as they reduce the funds available for 
investment. According to Blake and Board (2000), front-loaded charges do not 
tend to provide the best incentive for fund managers to deliver good service. 
Blake and Board (2000) showed that it is very difficult to determine the total 
charge that will be levied on a particular fund, because of the complex 
interactions between the components of the total charge and also because the 
use of performance-related charges requires an estimate of future performance 
to be made before charges can be projected.25 
Blake and Board (2000) conclude their study by agreeing with the UK Office of 
Fair Trading in so far as it asserts that 
"the best way [to run a simplified defined-contribution pension scheme] is to embrace 
passive fund management, thus requiring funds to compete in terms of their 
administration costs, not their spurious promises of future excess returns."26 
Given the up-front impact of the charges levied under the front-load fee structure, 
there is a case for an appraisal activity. This activity will seek to match the fees 
extracted from the contributions with the returns accruing to the fund to gauge if 
24 Charges are said to be front-loaded if they are levied prior to the delivery of the service to which 
they relate, while they are said to be back-loaded if they are levied afterwards. 
25 A further difficulty is caused by the differing treatment of commission. Most pension plans are 
arranged either through a firm's own sales force or appointed representatives, or through an 
independent financial adviser (IFA). In most cases pension plan charges will include an element 
of commission payable by the provider to the arranger of the plan. Some plans, however, are 
commission free, which means that the arranger's fee must be paid directly by the customer. 
Clearly any complete assessment of a plan's costs should include both the provider's charges 
and the commission payable. 
26 Office of Fair Trading, 1999b, P.2. 
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value has been created. Performance evaluation is critical in so far as it 
determines whether the fund has realised superior returns as a result of active 
management that adequately compensate for the fees levied. 
The critical need to rigorously assess the performance of portfolio managers was 
also indicated by Rubinstein (2003 cited by Anon, 2003). According to Rubinstein 
(2003 cited by Anon, 2003), financial economists have a duty to develop what he 
casually termed good ways to measure performance which will help in weeding 
out irrational money managers. Rubinstein (2003 cited by Anon, 2003) marshals 
compelling arguments affirming the minimal rationality of the market and thereby 
undermining the case for active portfolio management. With the aid of Jensen 
(1968 cited by Rubinstein, 2003), he concludes in his article that the average 
actively managed fund does not outperform a market index. According to 
Rubinstein (2003 cited by Anon, 2003) the average fund underperforms by about 
the size of its fees and trading costs. 
Notwithstanding all the controversies around active management, it is worth 
noting that for the market to remain efficient, active fund management has to be 
pursued as it ensures that stock mispricing and profiting opportunities are eroded 
and that markets are constantly restored to equilibrium. Active fund managers 
should be rewarded for their efforts through the use of performance-related fees, 
thus re-enforcing the critical need for rigorous performance attribution measures. 
Other studies that tackled this subject include the earlier works of Sharpe (1966 
cited by Blake and Board, 2000), Jensen (1968 cited by Blake and Board, 2000) 
and Treynor (1965 cited by Blake and Board, 2000). The findings of Sharpe 
(1966 cited by Blake and Board, 2000) and Jensen (1968 cited by Blake and 
Board, 2000) demonstrated that mutual funds perform below market indexes and 
suggest that the returns were not sufficient to compensate investors for the 
diverse mutual fund charges. Sharpe (1966 cited by Blake and Board, 2000) 
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found that funds with lower expense ratios provided better net returns than funds 
with high expense ratios. Sharpe (1966 cited by Blake and Board, 2000) 
concluded that investors were not being compensated for the loaded fees. 
According to Blake and Board (2000), the front loaded fees have a value-
destructive role in themselves when looked at from the perspective of the 
reduction in contribution (RiC) measure.27 This measure expresses the loss in 
value arising from the fund's charges as the difference between the gross 
contributions and the effective contribution applied to the fund, where effective 
contributions are defined as the contributions that would have to be paid into a 
zero-load plan so as to generate the same terminal value as the scheme in 
question. Blake et al (1998) demonstrated that most UK pension fund managers 
earn fees related solely to the value of assets under management and not to their 
relative performance against either a predetermined benchmark or their peer 
group in the market. 
2.15 PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
The performance of investment portfolios in South Africa as well as globally has 
been a subject of numerous studies. A number of studies have focused on 
testing the existence of performance persistence for these funds, while others 
have pursued the more fundamental question of how to evaluate performance in 
27 The reduction in contributions is not a new measure. It is also known as a percentage rate of 
premium and it was the measure of reporting charges originally recommended by the UK's 
Securities and Investment Board for the new disclosure regime for life assurance and unit trusts 
that came into operation in January 1990 (see Securities and Investment Board, 1988). However, 
following industry representations, the Securities and Investment Board adopted the reduction in 
yield measure of reporting charges on the grounds that it is a more appropriate approach for a 
product intended to be a long-term investment vehicle and that the short-term impact of charges 
is broadly reflected in the discontinuance values which have to be disclosed (Securities and 
Investment Board, 1989, p.15). 
- 8 1 -
the first place. A study by Jensen (1968 cited by Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) 
concluded that active mutual funds under perform their benchmarks by 1% per 
year on average. He further found that only one third of equity funds outperform 
the S&P 500 in any given year. 
Malkiel (1973, 1984 cited by Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) found that two thirds of 
mutual fund managers under performed the market averages and that an equal 
percentage of pension fund managers underperformed the market averages. In 
support of the Jensen (1968 cited by Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) conclusions, 
Malkiel (1973 cited by Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) also noted that average equity 
mutual funds underperformed the S&P 500 index by 1,8%. 
On the question of performance persistence, Bogle (2000 cited Grinblatt and 
Titman, 1989) found that top performers of the previous year do not outperform in 
the following year and, further, that top performers for the past ten years do not 
outperform in the following ten years. Carhart (1985 cited by Grinblatt and 
Titman, 1989) also found that equity mutual funds underperformed the market by 
1,8% per year after adjusting for risk. The Carhart (1985 cited by Grinblatt and 
Titman, 1989) study concludes that there is little evidence of stock-picking ability 
and no evidence of persistence in performance. The study also notes that 3 1 % of 
mutual funds have ceased to exist over the past 30 years, which strengthens the 
case for persistence in poor performance. 
It is important to note also a study by Hagstrom (2001) which underscores the 
essence of this current study as well as the methodology followed. In his study 
Hagstrom (2001) notes that the traditional yardstick that is often used when 
measuring performance is price change: the difference between the prices 
originally paid for the stock and its market price today. In the long run, existing 
theory tells us, the market price should approximate the change in the value of 
- 8 2 -
the business. In the short run, however, prices gyrate widely above and below a 
company's value; they are dependent on factors other than the progress of the 
business (Hagstrom, 2001). 
The problem is that most investors use short-term price changes to gauge the 
success or failure of their investment approach. The quarterly performance 
reports of most funds are based on data generated using these sometimes 
erratic stock price movements. Unfortunately, these short-term price changes 
often have little to do with the changing economic value of the business and 
much to do with anticipating the behaviour of other investors. In addition, 
professional investors are required by their clients to report performance in 
quarterly periods, as is the case with most South African provident funds. 
Frequently, clients become impatient while waiting for the price of their portfolio 
to grow at some predetermined rate. If they do not see short-term performance 
gains, clients become dissatisfied and sceptical of the investment professional's 
ability. Anticipating this imminent short-termist pressure and eager to cut their 
losses, fund managers precariously offload poor performers and look for the 
"must buy's" of the moment (Hagstrom, 2001). The unfortunate thing about this 
approach is that not only do funds loose out on the percentage decline in the 
previously held stocks, but they also pay premium prices to acquire positions in 
star performers. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are primarily two distinct research paradigms, quantitative research and 
qualitative research. Both generally aim for description, (understanding and) 
explanation and prediction. Quantitative research is based on numerical data and 
rigorous analysis of variables. This method produces statistical results and often 
enough lends itself to the prediction of phenomena. 
Qualitative research, by contrast is primarily based on non-numeric, qualitative 
data which during analysis are examined for patterns, themes and holistic 
features. According to Yin (1989 cited by Tellis, 1997), the qualitative method 
concentrates on describing, understanding and explaining. Apart from these two 
"pure" research paradigms, one can also use a combination called mixed 
research which mixes the best (or most useful) of both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods and combines both quantitative and qualitative 
data. This study contains a number of difficult-to-quantify aspects, so that the 
qualitative method was chosen. This choice is in line with the observations of Yin 
(1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) that, where the researcher is called upon to work with 
the situation that presents itself in each case, the qualitative method befits the 
task. 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
There are various types of qualitative research that can be used, depending on 
how appropriate they are for the task at hand. These are briefly explained in table 
3.1 on the next page: 









A form of qualitative research in which the researcher 
attempts to understand how one or more individuals 
experience a phenomenon. 
A form of qualitative research focused on describing the 
culture of a group of people. 
A form of qualitative research that is focused on providing 
a detailed account of one or more cases. 
A qualitative approach to generating a theory from data 
that the researcher collects. 
Research about events in the past. 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
According to Tellis (1997), an empirical investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context is one situation in which a case-study 
methodology is applicable. Tellis (1997) further observes that the case-study 
approach as well as other studies has been used extensively in areas such as 
government studies and evaluative situations. Tellis (1997) observes that the 
government studies were carried out to determine whether particular programs 
were efficient or if the goals of a particular program were being met. The 
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evaluative applications on the other hand were carried out to assess the 
effectiveness of educational initiatives. 
According to Tellis (1997), in both types of investigations quantitative studies 
tended to obscure some of the important information that the researchers needed 
to uncover. According to Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997), single-case designs are 
used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to present a unique or extreme case. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the fund management strategy of the 
Rennies Provident Fund created or destroyed shareholder value, a single-case 
study approach was followed. Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997) advanced that 
this approach is appropriate when the researcher wants to gain an understanding 
of the particulars of a specific case. 
Yin (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997) states that there are three conditions that 
influence the design of case studies: 
=> The type of research questions posed; 
=> The extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; 
and 
=> The degree of focus on contemporary events. 
The nature of the present study's research questions (What and Why questions) 
justifies an intrinsic exploratory-explanatory single-case study (Tellis, 1997). This 
view is supported by Yin (1993 cited by Tellis, 1997), Levy (1988 cited by Tellis, 
1997) and Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997). The investigator had no control 
over the actual behavioural events, which is a characteristic of case studies 
according to Tellis (1997). The current study also meets the third condition by 
examining contemporary events even though historic data were used. 
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Further, Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) proposes the following five components 
of case studies: 
=> The study's questions; 
=> its propositions, if any; 
=> the study's units of analysis; 
=> the logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
=> the criteria for interpreting the data. 
Similar to the Levy (1998 cited Tellis, 1997) study and the Tellis (1997) study, the 
present study does not have a proposition, and its unit of analysis is the case 
study Provident Fund. 
For the current single-case study, a four-stage research methodology was 
followed. The four stages that comprise the chosen methodology follow the 
recommendations of Yin (1994): 
1) Design the case study protocol: 
a. Determine the required skills and resources, and 
b. Develop and review the protocol. 
2) Conduct the case study: 
a. Prepare for data collection, 
b. Conduct desk top secondary data collection, 
c. Distribute questionnaires, and 
d. Conduct interviews. 
- 8 7 -
3) Analyse the case study evidence: 
a. Analytic strategy. 
4) Develop conclusions, recommendations and implications. 
3.2.1 Documentary Data 
Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997) and Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) identified 
six sources of evidence in case studies: 
=> Documents 
=> Archival records 
=> Interviews 
=> Direct observation 
:=> Participant-observation 
=> Physical artefacts 
Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) advances that not all sources are essential in 
every case study, but the importance of multiple sources of data to the reliability 
of the study is well established. 
The identified data sources for this study are: 
=> Documentation from the Rennies Provident Fund, annualised returns from 
other funds, performance reports from various asset management firms, 
study reports or any other relevant documentation that could add to the 
database. 
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=> Archival records, which include survey data (completed questionnaires). 
Confidentiality of the survey respondents is ensured by assigning 
codenames to the respondents. 
=> Interviews of trustees, to fill in gaps in the policy documents. 
Before a researcher starts collecting any data for the purposes of a study, it is 
critical to determine beforehand the purpose of collecting the data and what/who 
are the sources of that data. The relevant population is clearly defined in the next 
section. 
3.2.2 Population 
According to Donald and Schlinder (2003), research projects have a unit of study 
which is generally referred to as the population element. While this population 
element can be a person, it can easily be something else. 
For the purposes of this study, the population element is specified as all the 
members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed by South African Container 
Depots in Cape Town during the fourth quarter of 2003. 
3.2.3 Sampling 
With many research projects there is generally a finance and time constraint that 
researchers must grapple with. In order to manage this constraint, researchers 
sample the target population and use the findings from the sample to generalise 
their findings (Donald and Schlinder, 2003). 
However, for the purposes of this study, the researcher will survey all the 
members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed by South African Container 
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Depots in Cape Town during the fourth quarter of 2003. Thus, the researcher will 
not draw a sample of the respondents but rather will do a census. 
The reason for choosing a census is that the target population is not less than 
100 members and they are located in one depot in Cape Town. Thus it will not be 
expensive to survey all the members, and a census in turn will limit the error 
margins that are inherent in most research studies that use sampling, thereby 
increasing the reliability of the findings. 
3.2.3 Data collection methods 
According to Tellis (1997), a case study is known as an example of a triangulated 
research strategy. Feargin (1991 cited by Tellis, 1997) asserted that triangulation 
can occur with data, investigators, theories, and even methodologies. According 
to Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997), it is the protocols that are used to ensure 
accuracy and alternative explanations which are called triangulation. The need 
for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the process. 
In case studies this could be done using multiple sources of data (Yin 1984 cited 
by Tellis, 1997). Tellis (1997) argues that the problem in case studies is to 
establish meaning rather than location. 
Stake (1995 cited by Tellis, 1997) and Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997) identified 
six sources of evidence in case studies: 
=> Documents 
=> Archival records 
=> Interviews 
=> Direct observation 
=> Participant-observation 
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=> Physical artefacts 
According to Tellis (1997), when the researcher wants to triangulate evidence, 
documents can be used to corroborate evidence from other sources. For this 
study, only the first three sources of data listed above will be used, as discussed 
previously in section 1.6.2. Denzin (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997) identified four 
types of triangulation: data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for 
the data to remain the same in different contexts; investigator triangulation, when 
several investigators examine the same phenomenon; theory triangulation, when 
investigators with different view points interpret the same results; and 
methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by another, to 
increase confidence in the interpretation. 
According to Yin (1994 cited by Tellis, 1997), there are three tasks that must be 
carried out as part of the actual case study. These three tasks are: preparation 
for data collection, distribution of the questionnaire and conducting interviews. 
Data collection should be treated as a design issue that will enhance the internal 
validity of the study, as well as the external validity and reliability, (Yin 1994 cited 
by Tellis, 1997). 
In order to increase the reliability of the study, the survey questionnaire will be 
hand-delivered to the participants through shift supervisors. Reminders would be 
sent to participants one week after the original contact to encourage participation. 
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3.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND LAYOUT 
The first rule when designing a survey questionnaire is to design it so that it fits 
the medium to be used. The second rule of thumb to follow when designing a 
questionnaire is to keep it short and simple, in order to elicit a high response rate. 
3.3.1 Questionnaire layout 
In this research the questionnaires are going to be used to determine the 
members' risk profile, as well as their expectations in terms of returns; to 
establish their perceptions regarding the performance of the fund and, lastly, to 
determine their view on whether they see value added for them as a result of the 
fund's investment management strategy. The questions used in the questionnaire 
are of the definite multichoice type; one open-ended question is included in 
section 3 to solicit additional information that might be valuable to the study. 
To elicit this information, the questionnaire (see Appendix B) is divided into the 
following seven main parts: 
Part 1 - Member's personal information and contact information - was designed 
to establish the member's position within SACD and to determine the correlation 
between the members' contributions and their salary bracket. 
Part 2 - Permission to use the data for the research - was designed to obtain 
informed consent from the members/respondents. 
Part 3 - Members' profile - was designed to obtain data on the member's number 
of years with the fund, risk profile, and risk appetite. 
Part 4 - Asset allocation and performance target - was designed to obtain data 
concerning the member's investment approach preference and return 
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requirements. 
Part 5 - Fund performance - was designed to solicit data on how the members 
perceive the fund to have performed, to determine their gains or losses in 
monetary terms for the period under investigation, and to determine their monthly 
contributions. 
Part 6 - Performance objectives - was designed to determine the 
appropriateness of the Rennies Provident Fund's stated return requirements. 
Part 7 - "Other issues" - was designed to determine any other issues that are 
relevant to the study from the member's perspective. 
3.3.2 Analysis 
According to Tellis (1997), analysing case study evidence is the least developed 
aspect of the case study methodology and hence the most difficult. Tellis (1997) 
further states that some researchers have suggested that if the study were made 
amenable to statistical analysis, the process would be easier and more 
acceptable. 
Miles and Huberman (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997) suggested analytic techniques 
such as rearranging the arrays, placing the evidence in a matrix of categories, 
creating flowcharts or data displays, tabulating the frequency of different events, 
using means, variances and cross-tabulations to examine the relationships 
between variables, and other such techniques to facilitate analysis. 
Tellis (1997) argues that there must first be an analytic strategy that will lead to 
conclusions. Yin (1994 cited Tellis, 1997) presented two strategies for general 
use: one is to rely on theoretical propositions of the study, and then to analyse 
the evidence based on those propositions. The other technique is to develop a 
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case description, which would be a framework for organising the case study. 
According to Tellis (1997), Lynd conducted a widely cited "Middletown" study in 
1929, and used a formal chapter construct to guide the development of the 
analysis. Tellis (1997) further argues that in other situations, the original objective 
of the case study may help to identify some causal links that could be analysed. 
3.3.3 Validity and reliability 
Validity is a term used in research methodology that indicates the extent to which 
a test complies with the aim it was designed for (Tellis, 1997). Reliability, on the 
other hand, deals with how certain a researcher is that an inference he/she has 
made is correct. Since all inferences are based on partial information about a 
population, there is always a chance that the inference made is incorrect. The 
science of statistics, however recognises this fact and requires that every 
inference be accompanied by a measure of its reliability, as claimed by Dietrich 
and Schafer (1984 cited by Tellis, 1997). According to Tellis (1997), reliability and 
validity are the most critical elements of all research projects. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the primary goal of the Rennies Provident Fund, the Fund's return 
requirements, the Fund's investment constraints, investment guidelines for asset 
managers, the performance benchmark and performance statistics will be 
discussed. The analysis that is presented in this chapter is based on secondary 
data. 
4.2 PRIMARY GOAL OF THE FUND AND ROLE PLAYERS 
The stated primary goal of the Rennies Provident Fund is to provide a generous 
lump sum to members on retirement which includes the build-up of contributions 
with real growth. The Fund's policy document delegated the responsibility of 
running the Fund to elected trustees who in turn delegated this role to the 
investment sub-committee. According to the policy document the investment sub-
committee is charged with contracting investment managers and making the 
decisions that may need to be taken regarding investment matters, provided that 
they are taken within the framework of the Rennies Provident Fund's investment 
policy document. 
The Fund's investment policy document also specifically states that the 
investment managers will be required to conform to the investment mandate 
provided to them by the investment sub-committee, and that they should be 
employing sound audit principles at all times and report back regularly to the 
investment sub-committee. The Fund's investment policy document also states 
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the role of the investment consultants; according to the document the consultants 
are responsible for drafting and explaining the portfolio manager mandates and 
facilitate in setting appropriate benchmarks.28 The Fund's investment policy 
document further states that, the investment consultants should also assist the 
investment sub-committee with all investment-related matters as they arise, and 
assist with all functions relating to the restructuring of the Fund's assets. 
4.3 RETURN REQUIREMENTS 
According to subsection 5.1 of the Fund's investment policy discussion 
document, the Fund aims to provide better returns to the members than 
members could obtain alone. The fund aims to achieve superior returns by 
pooling the members' separate investments to achieve economies of scale with 
investments in a diversified portfolio. The document makes a note that 
measurement against inflation should only be done over long periods of rolling 
three, five and ten year periods. The Fund primarily aims to beat an internal 
benchmark of CPI +3% over the long term. According to the Fund's investment 
policy document, the Fund intends maintaining a buffer to smooth returns and be 
able to absorb adverse market conditions as a result of its exposure in equities. 
4.4 INVESTMENT CONSTRAINTS 
The Rennies Provident Fund's investment policy discussion document 
categorises constraints as follows: investment time horizon, liquidity 
considerations, tax considerations and legal constraints, strategic 
28 Attempts to get the documented mandates for the five different asset managers who were 
managing the Fund's assets during the 2003 financial year were unsuccessful, as NBC advised 
that they were not in a position to disclose this information. 
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holdings/unlisted investments and socially responsible investments, offshore 
investments and general constraints. 
4.4.1 Investment time horizon 
By virtue of the fact that the Fund is a retirement fund, its investment horizon as it 
is stated in its investment policy discussion document is long-term. The effective 
time horizon for asset managers however is shorter. According to the Fund's 
investment policy discussion document, this is due to the fact that asset 
managers need to demonstrate performance on a regular basis. 
The case for balance between short-term performance requirements and the 
need to provide for the long term is highlighted and linked to the selection of 
appropriate assets. The stated official performance evaluation period is three 
years. 
4.4.2 Liquidity 
The fund is generally not constrained by liquidity considerations under normal 
conditions. However, the fund should be in a position to meet extraordinary 
liquidity requirements when they arise. The policy document states that the 
Fund's holding in an investment should not cause it difficulty in liquidating the 
holding, and that such liquidation should not affect the price of the asset in 
question.29 In line with the aforementioned point, the Fund is wary of guaranteed 
products and insurance company smooth-bonus investments, given their liquidity 
constraints. The Fund views the use of derivatives and other structured 
guaranteed products as limiting since sometimes they have lock-in periods which 
would further constrain liquidity. The trustees are also precluded from investing 
29 Investment Policy Document, Rennies Provident Fund, p. 7. 
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directly in property and other private equity vehicles. 
4.4.3 Tax considerations and legal constraints 
The Rennies Provident Fund's investment policy discussion document requires 
asset managers to consider the implications of tax on member's benefits when 
devising their asset allocation strategies within the parameters of the mandates 
set by the trustees. The fund is subject to the provisions of Regulation 28 of the 
Pension Funds Act 1956. 
4.4.4 Strategic holdings, unlisted investments and socially responsible 
investments 
According to the Fund's investment policy, it does not intend to enter into any 
future agreements binding it to hold specified investments for periods exceeding 
three years. The Fund's investment policy also states that strategic holdings must 
be ratified by the Board of Trustees. In particular, investments with a lock-in or 
with a term in excess of one year should be discussed by the Board of Trustees 
prior to approval. 
Investments in unlisted assets are limited to 2,5% of the Fund, in line with 
Regulation 28, and they must be agreed on with the Board of Trustees prior to 
commitment. Without explicit trustee approval this type of investment is not 
allowed in terms of the Fund's policy document, with the exception of the 
following: 
• International banks with a Moody's international rating of Aa2 or higher, 
• Standard and Poor's rating of AA- or higher, and 
• Domestic banks with a CA- Ratings long-term rating equal to or better than 
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ZaA. 
The Fund acknowledges the positive social impact of investing in socially 
responsible investments; however, an investment limit of 10% of the Fund's 
assets has been set for this type of assets. 
4.4.5 Offshore investments and other limitations 
The Fund views holding positions in offshore assets as a sound investment 
strategy for the purposes of minimising risk. Investment in these assets, however, 
is capped at 15% of the Fund's value by the South African Reserve Bank; the 
Fund's asset managers are not precluded from maximising this limitation. 
4.5 INVESTMENT GUIDELINES FOR ASSET MANAGERS 
The asset managers are allowed to take advantage of anomalies in derivative 
pricing in order to enhance the portfolio's investment returns; derivatives may 
also be bought to provide insurance against a specific event. They can also be 
used to effectively allocate funds across different asset classes or as a hedging 
tool. 
However, they may not be used to speculate in the derivative market or be used 
in geared transactions. Scrip lending is also provided for, as long as it does not 
impede the manager's ability to manage the assets within his given mandate. 
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4.6 PERFORMANCE OF THE RETIREMENT FUND INDUSTRY IN GENERAL 
AND THE RENNIES PROVIDENT FUND IN PARTICULAR 
In this section the performance statistics of the retirement industry in general and 
those of the Rennies Provident Fund in particular will be discussed. These 
statistics were obtained from various secondary data sources in order to 
undertake a desk-top comparative analysis of the performance of the Rennies 
Provident Fund versus the performance of the overall pension fund industry. 
4.6.1 General performance statistics of the retirement fund industry 
According to the 44th Annual Report from the Registrar of Pension Funds (2002), 
there was a count of 14 257 pension funds in operation in South Africa, with 
aggregate net assets under management totalling R867 396m30. For the same 
period reported, these pension funds had a combined total membership of 
approximately 9,7m policyholders who collectively contributed R60 552m31 into 
their respective funds for the same reported 2002 period. These funds in turn 
paid out benefits of approximately R72 492m for the same reporting period. 
By just doing a crude arithmetic comparison of benefits paid out vis-a-vis the 
contributions received for the 2002 reporting period, the result is a deficit of 
R11 940m for the year. 
R60 552m - R72 492m = -R11 940m 
With this deficit in mind, it becomes strikingly clear that funds have to maintain a 
30 44th Annual Report of the South African Registrar of Pension Fund's, 2002, (p.20). 
31 This is an inflated figure due to double counting, as some members belong to more than one 
fund. 
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certain level of reserves to meet imminent benefit payouts. 
The 44th Annual Report from the Registrar of Pension Funds also notes a 47 % 
downwards move in the combined return on investments generated by registered 
pension funds for the 2002 reporting period. The funds posted returns averaging 
8,7 %, while in 2001, 16,4 % returns on investments was posted32. According to a 
report posted on the JCCI's website, the returns of the Chamber's pension fund 
as at December 2004 were 20,29% for the past 12 years, 19,44% for the past 10 
years, 23,43% for the past 5 years and 23,02% for the past 12 months up to 31 
December 2004. 
4.6.2 Performance statistics of the Rennies Provident Fund 
As stated earlier, the Fund has for the past 17 years returned on average 13 % 
per annum. For the 2003 financial year the returns that were declared were 
-5,7%. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below give an overview of the performance statistics of 
the Rennies Provident Fund. These are presented against both the consumer 
price index as well as against the internally set benchmark of CPI + 3%. 
32 The reported returns were calculated using the following formula: R = 2i IA + B- I where R = 
returns on investments, A = initial value of investments, S = end value of investments / = interest, 
dividends, rent, policy income or any other realised income and or expenses. 
-101 -












































































Source: Adapted (2005). 
The Fund on average outperformed the CPI over the 17-year period by 3 %. 
The figures listed here for the CPI are unrevised figures; they were the official figures reported 
by Statistics South Africa in 2005, prior to the revision of CPI figures which took place recently. 
The fund interest figures were obtained from the Rennies Provident Fund. 
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Table 4.2 - Fund real returns vs. required real returns 
Period j _ ~ ; ^ jFund Interest jShort/Outperformance 
Apr-87 i 20.3%i 15.0%i -5.3% 
Apr-88 i 15.9%i 15.0%i -0.9% 
Apr-89 i 17.9%! 18.0%i 0.1% 
Apr-90 | l6.9%[ 18.6°/cT i . i% 
Apr-9l" i l8.2%j 18.6%!. -0.2% 
Apr-92 i 17.8%] 18".6%i 0.2% 
Apr-93 i 13.6%i 18.0%: 4.4% 
Apr-94 i 10.2%i 14.0%i 3.8% 
Apr-95 : 13.8%[ 15.6%! T.2% 
Apr-96 ! 8.9%! 13".6%T 4.1% 
Apr-97 : 12.5%[ 18.6%| 5.5% 
Apr-98 i 8.2%i 15.0%i 6.8% 
Apr-99 i 10.6%i 3.0°/oi -7.6% 
Apr-00 ! 7.5%! 10.0%! 2.5% 
Agr-6l" ! 9.5%i 6.5%! -3.6% 
Apr-02 ! il".0%[ f5.6%T 4.6% 
Apr-03 i 11.8%i -5.7%: -17.5% 
Average 13.2%: 13.2<>/o! 0.0% 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
Table 4.2 above reveals that on average for the 17-year period the Fund's 
declarations have mirrored the Fund's required rate of returns of 13,2%. 
The required returns are obtained by adding 3 percentage points to a given years CPI rate. 
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4.7 ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUND 
Based on the secondary data presented in 4.6, the following tentative 
observations can be made: 
4.7.1 Evaluation criterion 1 - Returns vs. internal benchmark of CPI + 3% 
An analysis using the first evaluation criterion - average real returns vs. the 
internally set benchmark of CPI + 3% over the past 17 years - reveals the 
following: 
• The Fund has on average preserved the purchasing power of the 
members' investment in the fund by declaring positive average real 
returns. 
• The Fund has over the 17-year period declared on average returns 
equalling CPI + 2,9%. 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the Rennies Provident Fund's performance 
against the consumer price index as well as the Fund's internally set benchmark 
of CPI + 3. 
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of returns declared by the Rennies Provident Fund with 
the consumer price index over a 17 year period. 
-5% -3% -1% 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15% 17% 19% 
Returns 
1CPI m Fund Interest 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
Figure 4.1 above reveals that the Fund's returns were only below the inflation 
rate on two occasions, 1987 and 2003. In other years the Fund's declared returns 
comfortably exceeded the inflation rate, thereby providing positive real returns to 
members. 
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- Required Returns* - • - Fund Interest 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
As can be seen from Figure 4.2 above, for the years 1987, 1988, 1999, 2001 and 
2003 the Fund's returns were below the set internal benchmark of CPI +3%. In 
1987 the fund fell short by -5,3%, in 1988 by -0,9%, in 1991 by -0,2%, in 1999 by 
-7,6%, in 2001 by -3,0% and in 2003 by -17,5%. Quite clearly the fund under-
performed its benchmark on six different occasions; during these periods 
members lost out significantly from this poor performance. However, because of 
lack of real data, these loses could not be quantified in South African rand terms 
in this study. 
Required returns were derived by adding 3% to the annual CPI for the 17-year period under 
review. 
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4.7.2 Evaluation criterion 2 - Declared returns vs. returns from other 
similar pension funds 
Using data from the 2005 Alexander Forbes Large Manager Watch report, the 
2005 ABSA Consulting Actuaries Report, and other sources, comparison of the 
performance of the Rennies Provident Fund with that of peers is made. 
Figure 4.3: Comparative performance overview - Rennies Provident Fund vs. the 
JCCI Pension Fund36•3738 
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 
Annualised Returns 
[a JCCI Pension Fund I I Rennies Provident Fundj 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
The JCCI Pension Fund clearly outperformed the Rennies Provident Fund for the 
comparison periods listed above, by huge margins. Compared to this 
36 The JCCI Pension Fund utilised Investment Solutions portfolios, with assets allocated as 
follows: 40% in the Performer Portfolio, 60% in the Allan Gray Portfolio. 
37 The fund's long term strategy is to achieve real rates of returns of 6% per annum over rolling 5 
year periods relative to core CPI. 
38 Source: www.jcci.co.za/bmember/pension.html 
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performance, the management strategy of the Rennies Provident Fund resulted 
in inferior performance. The JCCI Pension Fund's investment objective is also 
ambitious when compared to that of the Rennies Provident Fund. The JCCI 
Pension Fund aims for 6% real returns, while the Rennies Provident Fund aims 
for a meagre 3%. It is however difficult to link the 3% to the risk appetite of the 
Rennies Provident Fund, as the membership risk profile assessment was still 
outstanding for the period under review. 
Figure 4.4: Comparative performance overview - 5 year period (Rennies Provident 
Fund vs. the Allan Gray Balanced Fund) 
Rennies Benchmark 
Rennies Provident Fund 
Ailan Gray Benchmark 
Allan Gray Balanced Fund 
IB Allan Gray Balanced Fund I I Allan Gray Benchmark D Rennies Provident Fund D Rennies Benchmark | 
Source: Adapted (2005). 
Compared to the Allan Grey Balanced Fund, the Rennies Provident Fund was 
outperformed by huge margins. The benchmark that the Fund adopted is shown 
to be conservative and is a disservice to shareholders. 
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4.7.3 Evaluation criterion 3 - Value-based method (money-weighted 
returns) 
In this subsection the value-based method - which measures the manager's 
contribution by the difference between the final market value of the investor's 
holding in the Fund, with its associated cash flows over time, and the final value 
of the equivalent holding in the Fund's benchmark - is used to evaluate the 
Fund's performance for the 2003 period.39 The value-based method is also 
supported by Bagot and Armitage (2003). 
Table 4.3 below shows that the estimated money-weighted returns for the 2003 
period amounted to -7,0%.40 
Table 4.3: Estimated money-weighted returns 
• i 
i • 
Investment Manager -Type jFair Value 
• i 
Metropolitan j Guaranteed ] R24 418 263 
ofdmutuaT : Endownment ! R7 095 039 
Community Growth ! Managed j R12 655 792 
IS Performer ! Managed ! R7 996 678 
IS Entrepreneur j Managed j " R5~3 926 430 
Oldmutual : s'hares : R21~3~6 
African Harvest 1 Shares 1 R240 397 
Total Invested Assets! R106 334 735 
• 









Source: Rennies Provident Fund Financial Report, 2003. 
Comparison was only made to 2003, due to lack of data for other periods. 
40 These figures were obtained from the Rennies Provident Fund's Financial Report for the 2003 
financial year end. 
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Source: Adapted (2005). 
From the above overview (Figure 4.5) which is based on an analysis of data 
obtained from the Rennies Provident Fund, it appears that the IS Performer and 
IS Entrepreneur destroyed value for the 2003 observation period and that the 
actual value created by the entire portfolio did not compensate for this poor 
performance. The observation is in line with one of the disadvantages of fund 
splitting that were highlighted earlier on in the literature review section of this 
study. 
While the IS Performer portfolio performed badly during the 2003 financial year 
for the Rennies Provident Fund, the JCCI Pension Fund reported that since 
October 1997, this portfolio has on average earned the fund 14,26% per annum. 
While in the short term a portfolio might perform badly, when looked at over a 
longer period different conclusions can be drawn regarding the same portfolio's 
performance. 
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4.8 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIMARY DATA 
In this section the primary data collected through interviews with a representative 
from NBC as well as with Trustees from SACD and through the survey that was 
carried out are analysed, and tentative observations and findings are 
pronounced.41 Responses were received from 47 respondents out of a total 
surveyed population of 110. 
4.8.1 Section 1: Members 'profile 
Members' profile (questions 1.1.1 to 1.1.5) was designed to establish the risk 
profile of the members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed at SACD Cape 
Town with the objective of testing the synergy or compatibility between the 
Fund's investment management strategy, specifically the Fund's asset allocation 
strategy, and the risk profile of the Fund's members. 
Question 1.1.1 - Number of years with the Rennies Provident Fund 




































Source: Adapted (2006). 
41 See Appendix B for the interview schedule and example of the survey questionnaire. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.6 shows that 60,9 % of the respondents at SACD Cape Town have been 
members of the Rennies Provident Fund for more than 12 years, 21,7 % have 
been with the Fund for a period of between 8 - 1 1 years, 13 % for a period of 
between 4 - 7 years and 4,3 % for a period of 3 years and below. 
Question 1.1.2- Number of years to retirement 
This question in combination with question 1.1.1 above seeks to establish 
whether the surveyed members of the Rennies Provident Fund at SACD Cape 
Town are in an accumulation phase or decumulation phase of their investment 
life. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.7: Bar chart depicting the number of years to retirement 






0-3 4-7 8-11 12 and above 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.7 above shows that 39,1 % of the respondents still have 12 years or 
more to retirement, 37 % still have between 8 - 1 1 years to retirement, 15,2 % 
have between 4 - 7 years to retirement, and 8,7 % have 3 years or less to 
retirement. Thus, over 60 % of the members of the Rennies Provident Fund are 
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still in the accumulation phase of their investment life, while more than 20 % are 
in the decumulation phase of their investment life. 
Question 1.1.3 - Members' investment risk preference 
This question was designed to establish the respondent's attitude towards 
investment risk using three risk preference levels: risk taker, moderate risk taker 
and not a risk taker. 
































Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Moderate risktater Not a risktater 
Figure 4.8 shows that 63 % of the respondents do not have a preference for 
taking investment risks (they are risk-averse), 17,4 % are moderate risk takers 
and 19,6 % are investment risk takers. This figure reveals that the majority of the 
respondents at SACD Cape Town have a preference for a low risk investment 
regime 
Question 1.1.4 - Other investments held 
This question was designed to establish whether the respondents have other 
investments apart from the Rennies Provident Fund. This question allows the 
researcher to establish what level of exposure the respondents can reasonably 
enjoy and also to establish their ability to objectively compare the returns offered 
by the Rennies Provident Fund with other similar investments. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Yes l\b 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.9 show that 87 % of the respondents do have other investments, while 
the remaining 13 % of the respondents do not. 
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4.8.2 Section 2: Asset allocation and performance target 
Asset allocation and performance target (questions 1.2.1 to 1.2.2) were designed 
to establish the investment approach preference and the expected corresponding 
returns of the members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed at SACD Cape 
Town. The objective was to gather primary data that will enable the researcher to 
test the synergy or compatibility between the Fund's investment management 
strategy, specifically the Fund's asset allocation strategy, the corresponding set 
investment targets, and the expectations and preferences of the respondents. 
Question 1.2.1 - Preferred investment approach 
This question was designed to establish the investment approach preferred by 
the members of the provident fund at SACD Cape Town. 

































Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Figure 4.10: Bar chart depicting investment approach preference 
Value investor Growth investor Don't kiow 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.10 shows that 41,3 % of the respondents have a preference for a value-
investing approach, while 43,5 % of the respondents have a preference for a 
growth-investing approach. 15.2 % of the respondents indicated that they did not 
know what their investment approach preference was. The above figure shows 
an almost even distribution of investment approach preference between the 
respondents that made a choice between value investing and growth investing. 
Question 1.2.2 - Expected average real return per annum 
This question was designed to establish the expected average real return per 
annum from the perspective of the respondents. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 










Source: Adapted (2006). 
11-15% 16 and above 
Figure 4.11 above shows that 71,7 % of the respondents expect an average real 
returns of 16 % and above, 21,7 % expect an average real return of somewhere 
between 11 - 15 %, and 6,5 % expect average real returns of somewhere 
between 5 - 1 0 %. It is interesting to note that 63 % of the respondents classified 
themselves as being risk-averse, yet 71,1 % of the same respondents want 
average real returns of 16 % and above. 
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4.8.3 Section 3: Fund performance 
Fund performance (questions 1.3.1 to 1.3.3) was designed to establish the 
perceptions of the members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed at SACD 
Cape Town about the performance of the fund to date. The objective was to 
gather primary data that will enable the researcher to test the alignment between 
the fund's investment objectives and set performance targets and the member's 
perceptions. 
Question 1.3.1 - Perceived performance levels of the fund 
This question was designed to determine the perceptions of the respondents of 
the performance of the fund, using a three-point rating scale of good, average 
and poor. 




















Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Figure 4.12: Bar chart depicting the perceived performance levels of the fund 
Poor 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.12 show that 100 % of the respondents perceive the performance of the 
fund to have been poor since they joined it. Viewed against the responses given 
to question 1.2.2, there is a degree of inconsistency in the responses given: to be 
consistent, either 28,2 % should have rated the Fund's perceived performance as 
average, or 21,7 % should have rated it as average while 6,5 % should have 
rated it as good given their respective expected average real returns. Based on 
the analysis of the comments given as part of the responses to question 1.3.1, 
the negative declarations for the 2003 financial year have overshadowed the 
Fund's comparatively good performance in the past periods. 
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Question 1.3.2 - Money-weighted returns for 2003 
This question was designed to establish the monetary value of the -5 % 
declaration for the 2003 financial year. 




































Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.13: Bar chart depicting the money weighted returns for 2003 
70 T 
R0-R3O0O 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
R3O01-R5OOO R5001-R7000 R7001and above 
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Figure 4.13 show that 60,9 % of the respondents lost between R7 000 and more 
during the 2003 financial year, 21,7 % lost between R5001 - R7000, 13 % lost 
between R3001 - R5000 and 4,3 % lost R3000 or less. 
Question 1.3.3 - Monthly contributions 
This question was designed to establish the monthly contributions that the 
respondents make to the Rennies Provident Fund. 































Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Figure 4.14: Bar chart depicting monthly contributions 
60-
RD-R500 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
R501-R1000 R1001 and above 
Figure 4.14 show that 45,7 % of the respondents contribute R500 or less per 
month to the Rennies Provident Fund, 47,8 % contribute between R501 - R1000 
per month and 6,5 % contribute R1001 or more per month. 
Question 1.3.4 - Opening balance for 2003 
This question was designed to establish the respondents' opening balance for 
2003. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.15 show that 82,6 % of the respondents had an opening balance of 
R75001 or more, 4,3 % had a balance of about R50001 - R75000, 87 % had a 
balance of about R25001 - R50000 and 4,3 % had an opening balance of 
R25000 or less. 
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4.8.4 Section 4: Performance Objectives 
"Performance objectives" (questions 2.1.1 to 2.1.2) was designed to establish the 
perceptions of the members of the Rennies Provident Fund employed at SACD 
Cape Town about the performance objectives that the fund has set for itself. 
Question 2.1.1 - Return requirements 
This question was designed to establish the views of the respondents of the 
appropriateness/fairness from the member's perspective of the performance 
objective that the fund has set for itself. 
Table 4.14: Table depicting the views of the respondents on the fairness of the 

























Source: Adapted (2006). 
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Figure 4.16: Bar chart depicting views of the respondents on the fairness of the 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.16 shows that 95,7 % of the respondents do not see the set 
performance objective of returning CPI + 3% to members as a fair performance 
target for the fund, while 4,3 % think this is a fair performance target that the fund 
has set for itself. 
Question 2.1.2 - Competitive return requirements 
This question was designed to establish the views of the respondents on what 
they consider to be a competitive return requirement for an average actively 
managed provident fund. 
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Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.17: Bar chart depicting a competitive return requirement 
5-10% 10-15% 15% and above 
Source: Adapted (2006). 
Figure 4.17 shows that 65,2 % of the respondents consider a return requirement 
of 15 % and above to be a competitive return requirement which an average 
actively managed provident fund should strive for, 30,4 % consider 10 - 15 % to 
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be a competitive range, while 4,3 % consider a range of 5 - 10 % to be 
competitive for an average actively managed Provident Fund. 
Overall, the findings of the survey questionnaire revealed a misalignment 
between what the members require from the Fund and the set performance 
objectives of the Fund. Two critical areas of misalignment are: 
^ the set performance objective for the Fund, and 
<5> the Fund's current asset allocation strategy. 
4.8.5 Informational Interviews 
The third element of the research involved informational interviews with one 
representative of NBC and three trustees from SACD Cape Town. These 
individuals were selected in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
reasoning behind the set performance targets as well as the current asset 
allocation strategy that the fund follows. 
The interviews with the trustees were semi-structured interviews carried out at 
SACD Cape Town offices, while the interview with the NBC representative was 
carried out at NBC offices in Sandton, Johannesburg. The interview with the NBC 
representative lasted 45 minutes, while the interviews with the trustees at SACD 
lasted 20 minutes each. 
The interviews all revealed the following: 
•^ That to date there has been no profiling of the members of the Fund 
in terms of their risk preference. 
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Q> That the current set performance objectives and the resultant asset 
allocation by the Fund are not based on an objective analysis of the 
members' risk profile and preference but rather on what the trustees 
and the administrators of the fund think is best for members. 
4.9 GENERAL FINDINGS 
The principal findings of the research interviews show: 
^ The Fund has successfully met its internally set performance 
objective of returning CPI + 3%; 
>̂ Members are not satisfied with the current performance objective of 
returning CPI + 3%; 
^ There is no relationship between the Fund's set performance target 
and the profile of the Fund's members or their performance 
expectations; 
<*> The Fund's asset allocation strategy is not based on an objective 
analysis of the members' risk profile or investment life stage 
(accumulation or decumulation phase); 
Q> The Fund has posted poor returns compared to similar funds in the 
market; and 
<*> From the member's perspective, the Fund's investment strategy 
has not created shareholder value over the past 17-year period. 
There are a number of reasons for the Fund's poor performance. They range 
from lack of a comprehensive member profiling, lack of investment management 
expertise on the part of the trustees, or poor investment decision-making on the 
side of the fund management managing the assets of the Rennies Provident 
Fund. However, intertwined with these possibilities is the general poor 
performance by the equities market during the 2002 - 2003 period. 
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4.10 SUMMARY 
To determine whether the Rennies Provident Fund created or destroyed 
shareholder value, research was first conducted which involved an extensive 
search of existing literature in the area of provident fund/pension fund 
performance evaluation. Qualitative research was then carried out within SACD 
Cape Town to find out how closely the issues raised in the literature related to the 
experiences and perceptions of the members of the Fund employed as SACD 
Cape Town. Also a desk-top comparative analysis was conducted to review the 
performance of the Rennies Provident Fund against the performance of similar 
funds using secondary data. 
The primary research carried out at SACD Cape Town revealed a mixture of 
views and perceptions towards the performance of the Rennies Provident Fund. 
The main issues that were highlighted revolved around the inappropriateness of 
the performance target that the fund has set itself (returning CPI + 3%). Use of 
the questionnaire, the interview data and the secondary data collected provided a 
complete picture on whether the Rennies Provident Fund's investment 
management strategy created or destroyed shareholder value. The data 
collected were triangulated to provide comfort on the validity of the findings. In 
this case study, the primary data collected were used to support the desktop 
comparative analysis and the interviews carried out, in order to determine 
whether the Fund's investment management strategy created or destroyed 
shareholder value. 
It is within this context that this case study was carried out using both qualitative 
and quantitative research methods to answer the same research question. This 
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analysis suggests that the current investment management strategy of the 
Rennies Provident Fund is not creating shareholders value. 
The following chapter will discuss the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section the findings of the study are summarised, and conclusions are 
drawn based on the data collected as well as the literature review carried out. 
5.2 CONCLUSION 
In line with the Rennies Provident Fund's investment objective of providing the 
members with returns that are superior to what they could have obtained by 
themselves, evaluation criterion one shows that the fund has delivered on its 
promise to members. It could however be argued whether the average -0 ,1% that 
they fell short is significant or not. The point to remember, however, is that the 
members do not necessarily have to invest their money on their own. There are a 
variety of investment vehicles available to them, for example, index funds with 
cheaper management fees, which they could use. Further, the survey that was 
carried out as part of this study revealed that 95,7 % of the Fund's members who 
were surveyed do not think that the current rate of return is appropriate, 
specifically their view is that it is too low a return rate in view of the management 
fees that are levied. 
Evaluation criterion two revealed that the fund has not outperformed the market. 
This observation suggests that members paid management fees that were not 
matched by superior performance. In the eyes of the members, the reduction in 
contributions (RiC) as a result of the management fees destroyed value as it (the 
reduction in contributions) reduced the money available for investment. Also the 
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degree to which the Rennies Provident Fund underperformed the replicating 
benchmark represents a destruction in value in the eyes of the members that was 
occasioned by the comparatively inferior performance of their Fund management 
strategy. An analysis of the risk profile of the members based on the survey data 
collected indicates a mismatch between the current balanced investment 
approach employed by the Fund versus the age and risk profile of the surveyed 
members. The Fund can increase its performance target and accordingly adjust 
its investment approach and adopt a more aggressive approach in line with the 
indicated return requirements (Figure 4.11) notwithstanding the indicated risk 
preference and investment approach preference. 
Evaluation criterion three reveals a significant reduction in the rand value of the 
members' investment in the Fund during the 2003 period. For some members the 
-7.0% of money-weighted returns translated into loses well above R20 000, and 
these losses might take time to recoup at current performance levels. Although 
Table 4.2 shows a break-even between the required returns and what the fund 
has returned on average in percentage terms, in monetary terms the losses are 
much higher than the returns earned. Members who have been with the Fund for 
long and are nearing retirement were the hardest hit by the negative performance 
in 2003. 
In the light of the above, the performance objectives that the Fund has set for 
itself need revision as they are not aggressive enough when compared to: what 
the market has to offer, what it (the market) has posted as average returns, and 
what the majority of the respondents to the survey consider to be an acceptable 
average return from an actively managed provident fund. However, this exercise 
will have to be linked to a thorough analysis of the Fund's membership risk and 
age profile, to ensure that there is correlation between what the Fund seeks to 
achieve and the retirement requirements of its members. 
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In summary, this study found that there is no significant value that has been 
added by the Fund's management strategy. During the 2003 financial year, the 
fund-splitting approach that the Fund adopted destroyed shareholder value as 
the losses incurred by some fund managers outweighed the positive returns 
posted by others. The study also highlighted that the management fees that have 
been paid over by the members have certainly destroyed value for members in 
the form of RiC (reduction in contributions), while no matching excess returns 
were realised to justify the charges. Further, using the evaluation criterion 1, this 
study found that the fund has fallen short of its promise to return to members 
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APPENDIX A - STOCHASTIC PENSION FUND MODEL 
Theoretical model 
Assume that there is a single risky asset whose returns, r{t), is generated by an 
independent normal distribution with mean, /L/, and variance, o243 Consider the 
accumulation phase of a defined contribution pension plan which begins with an 
initial investment ^(0) (which might be zero) and makes regular contributions of d 
per period. Returns are continuously compounded so that at any time t, the value 
of the assets in the fund will be log-normally distributed and determined by the 
following accumulation equation: 
(1) A(t) = [A(t-l) + d].exp(r(t)). 
The first four non-central moments of the distribution of A ( t ) are given by: 
(2) f(t) = E[A(t)] 
= E[A ( f - 1 ) + d].E[exp(r(t))] 
= [/{t-l) + d]Mi 
(3) g(t) = E[A(tf] 
= [g(t-l) + 2.d.f(t-l) + d2].m2 
(4) h(t) = E[A(tf] 
= [h(t~l) + 3.dg(t-l) + 3.d2f(t-l) + di].mi 
See Blake (2003) for a more detailed discussion with illustrative examples. 
43 The assumption of independence is consistent with long term mean reversion in asset prices. 
Poterba and Summers (1998 cited Blake 2003) and Blake et al (1998) find evidence for this in the 
US and UK respectively. The assumption of long term normality in asset returns is consistent with 
the central limit theorem: the fat tails that are commonly observed in empirical asset returns 
distributions may well be the result of the smallness of the sample size used. 
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(5) k(t) = E[A(t)4} 
= [k(t-1 ) + 4.d.h(t-/\ ) + 6.d2.g{t-'\ ) +A.cP.fit--\ ) + d*].m4 
since A (7-1), d and r[t) axe all independent and where: 
(6) mj: = E [ exp (j.r (t))] = exp (j./j + 0.5./.O
2 ). 
The initial values for these iterations are: 
(7) / ( 0 ) = A (0), g (0) = [A (0)]2, h (0) = [A (0)]3, A (0) = [A (0)]4. 
Variance, skewness and kurtosis at t are given by: 
(8) V[A{t)] = E[A(t)-f(t)]2 
= g(t)-f(t? 
(9) S[A{t)] = E[A{t)-f{t)f 
= h(t)-3.g(t).J{t) + 2.J{t? 
(10) ^ J ( 0 ] = ^ [ ^ ( 0 - / ( 0 ] 4 
= k(t)-4.h(t).At) + 6.g(t).J(t)2-3.At)4. 
The value of the fund at t if it had been invested in a riskless asset with constant 
returns rf is denoted F(t) and is found using an equation similar to (1). 
Equation (1) can also be used to determine the value of the remaining assets in 
the decumulation phase of the plan which begins on the retirement date with a 
fund worth >A(0) and makes regular pension payments of d per period: in this 
case d < 0 in (1). The relevant moments are also given by (2) and (8) - (10). 
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In some jurisdictions, the size of d is actually determined to ensure that the plan 
member does not exhaust his fund before the end of his life: 
(11) d = A(0) 
a(0) 
where a (0) = X"f=o; Po e"7 is the annuity factor at retirement age 0 and tpo is the 
survival probability between retirement date 0 and time f. 
It is straightforward, though cumbersome, to show that the effect of an increase 
in asset risk o2 (holding [i constant) during the accumulation phase is to: 
• raise £[ A{ t)] 
• raise V[ A{ t)] 
• raise S [ / \ (0 ] 
• raise K[ A{ t)] 
The effect of an increase in asset risk is therefore to raise both the expected 
value and also to increase the right-skewness and fatten the tails of the 
distribution. This means that the distribution function of a fund invested in a high-
risk asset (denoted D( A( z;t, o2^)) below) will begin further to the left and so will 
initially be above that for a low risk asset (denoted D( A( z;t, o2/.)) below), but will 
cross over the latter function at some point and remain below thereafter. This 
means that a high-risk portfolio can never stochastically dominate a low-risk 
portfolio, since the following condition for (second-degree) stochastic dominance 
will be violated for small x: 
(12) K [D( A ( z; t; o*H)) -(A(z; t; o\))]dz < 0 
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Therefore, there always remains a trade-off between risk and expected returns. 
This can be illustrated using the commonly used investment strategy of cost 
averaging. During the accumulation phase of an investment programme with 
regular contributions, the average size of the terminal fund will be higher if the 
fund invests in assets with a large dispersion of returns than if it invests in assets 
with a small dispersion of returns but with the same expected returns. This is 
because there is a higher probability of buying assets at low prices and the 
increase in risk makes the terminal distributions of the fund more right-skewed. At 
the same time, the tails of the distribution are fatter and this raises the variance of 
the fund's terminal value as well as the probability of both very low and very high 
terminal values occurring. Risk-averse plan members will be concerned to reduce 
the probability of low terminal values and this requires higher contribution rates 
with high variance investment strategies than with low variance investment 
strategies. 
During the decumulation phase of the programme, when a regular income has to 
be paid from the fund, it is better to do this from assets with low dispersion of 
returns than with assets with high dispersion, even if the expected returns are the 
same. This is because there is a higher chance of having to sell assets at low 
prices and this may deplete the fund value such that even subsequent high 
investment performance may not be sufficient to compensate. 
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APPENDIX B - SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Permission to use my responses for academic research 
I hereby give permission that my responses may be used for research purposes provided that my 
identity is not revealed in the published records of the research. 
Signature: 
Please answer the following questions by filling in / ticking the check boxes provided. Where required, kindly 
provide comments on the space provided below the check boxes to enable the researcher to have more 
insight into your response? 
SECTION 1: MEMBER PROFILE 
1.1.1 How many years have you been a member of the Rennies Provident Fund? 
0-3 yrs 4-7 yrs 8-11 yrs 12yrs & above 
1.1.2 In how many years will you be retiring? 
0-3 yrs 4-7 yrs 8-11 yrs 12yrs & above 
1.1.3 If you were to classify yourself in terms of your investment risk preference, which 
category from the ones below would best describe your attitude towards investment risk? 
RISK TAKER MODERATE NOT A RISK TAKER 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RENNIES PROVIDENT FUNDS INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
1.1.4 Do you have any other investments apart from the Rennies Provident Fund? 
YES NO _j 
1.1.5 If the answer is Yes, can you please specify the name of the investment and the interest 
rate on that investment? 
NAME % INT. RATE 
SECTION 2: ASSET ALLOCATION AND PERFORMANCE TARGET 
1.2.1 Which investment approach do you have a preference for? 
VALUE I GROWTH 
INVESTOR INVESTOR 
1.2.2 What is the average real rate of return that you expect to get from your Provident Fund 
per annum? 
5 - 1 0 % 11 - 15% 15% and above 
SECTION 3: FUND PERFORMANCE 
1.3.1 What is your perception of the performance of the Rennies Provident Fund since you've 
joined it? 
GOOD I AVERAGE"T~P6OR" 
Can you comment on why do you view their performance as such? 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RENNIES PROVIDENT FUNDS INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
1.3.2 During the 2003 financial year when the fund declared -5% annualized returns, how 
much did you loose in absolute monetary terms? 
0 - R3000 R3001 - R5000 R5001 - R7000 R7000 and above 
1.3.3 How much do you contribute to the fund per month? 
D - R500 R501 - RIOOO R1000 and above 
1.3.3 What was your funds opening balance for 2003? 
0 - R25000 R2S000 - R50000 R50001 - R75000 R75000 and above 
SECTION 4: PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES (RETURN REQUIREMENTS) 
2.1.1 The Rennies Provident Fund has set itself a performance objective of returning CPI + 3% 
to its members. Would you say this is a fair performance target to set as a fund? 
YES NO 
2.1.2 Assuming the fund has a balanced mix of members in terms of their age profile and risk 
appetite. What do you consider to be a competitive return requirement that an average 
actively managed Provident Fund should have? 
5 - 10% 11 - 15% 15% and above 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RENNIE5 PROVIDENT FUNDS INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
SECTION 5 - OTHER ISSUES 
3.1 In closing, can you think of any other important issues that we have not touched relating 
to the investment fund management strategy and subsequent performance thereof of 
the Rennies Provident Fund? 
Thank you for your participation in this study. 
RESEARCH OFFICE (GOVAN MBEKI CENTRE) 
WESTVILLE CAMPUS 
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